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Public Administration Review

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Armed Forces Unification and the Pentagon Officer

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I

THIS paper reports some of the demands that have been placed upon military officers who are developing defense policies within a partially unified defense establishment. Many of the published studies of unification are concerned with organizational issues such as the appropriate functions of the Secretary of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The present study, in contrast, examines the views that military officers have expressed about the particular requirements and the relative attractiveness of positions in *joint*, as compared with *service*, organizations. It discusses organizational distinctions to provide background for an understanding of officers' attitudes. The paper is based on information secured by the authors in July, 1954, in personal interviews and in responses to a self-administered questionnaire completed by a sample of approximately 550 officers assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and each of the three service headquarters.¹

NOTE: This article is part of a larger study of military education, with emphasis on the preparation of career officers for policy-level responsibilities, which is being made under a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York.

¹ The questionnaire was administered to officers in the following organizations—Office of the Secretary of Defense: Offices of International Security Affairs, Manpower and Personnel, Supply and Logistics; Joint Staff: Joint Strategic Plans Group, Joint Logistics Plans

Unification of the armed forces is but one aspect of a larger process that has brought military officers into closer association with officers of other services, with civilian officials of their own and other executive departments, and with officials of foreign nations. Unification is primarily a product of the last fifteen years. It received a great stimulus from the disaster at Pearl Harbor. In the war that followed, close teamwork became imperative. At the highest level this necessity was reflected in the creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This interservice agency, first devised to work with the British for the purpose of combined planning, found itself planning and guiding our own joint operations; for the advent of amphibious warfare and the technological revolution that made air power a major element of military strength created a need for closer coordination of fighting forces both in the field and at the highest headquarters.

At the close of the war numerous schemes were advanced to maintain and strengthen the

Group, Joint Intelligence Group; Department of the Army: G-3 Plans Division, G-4 Logistics Plans Division, G-4 Foreign Aid Division; Department of the Navy: Strategic Plans Division, Politico-Military Policy Division, Pan-American and Military Assistance Division, Aviation Plans Division, Logistic Plans Division; Department of the Air Force: War Plans and Policy Divisions in the Directorate of Plans, Logistics Plans Division, and Office of the Assistant for Mutual Security. In all but one of these organizations at least 80 per cent of the officers on duty completed the questionnaire.

interservice planning and coordinating machinery that had developed in the heat of battle. The outcome of much maneuvering and counterproposal was the National Military Establishment created by the National Security Act of July 26, 1947. This added a third military department but brought all three into a weak federal union symbolized by a Secretary of Defense. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were recognized by statute as a planning and advisory group and they were authorized to have a staff of 100 officers who were to constitute a nucleus of jointly oriented personnel.

Since 1947 continuing efforts have been made to strengthen this new organization. Those who had based arguments for unification on the continued advances in military technology, or on the requirements of coalition planning, were now joined by administrators who sought to make their jobs more manageable and by advocates of "economy and efficiency" in government. In 1949, following a study of national security organization by the Hoover Commission, additional steps were taken toward unification.² The National Military Establishment became the Department of Defense. The Secretary of Defense was provided with a Deputy Secretary and three Assistant Secretaries, including a Comptroller. The position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was created. The Chairman was not given a vote but he was authorized to prepare the agenda, to preside at meetings, to expedite business, and to inform the Secretary of Defense of disagreements. The authorized strength of the Joint Staff was increased from 100 to 210.

Another step was taken in Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953.³ Six additional Assistant

Secretaries were authorized in the Defense Department. Tentative steps were taken to circumscribe the functions of the Joint Chiefs. One provision stipulated that their selection of the Director of the Joint Staff, and his tenure, "shall be subject to the approval of the Secretary of Defense." A second stipulated that their selection of the 200-odd members of the Joint Staff, and their tenure, "shall be subject to the approval of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." A third transferred to the Chairman the functions of JCS in "managing" both the Joint Staff and its Director. Management, in this context, did not include the assignment of major tasks, which continued to be a prerogative of JCS. The Chairman was authorized only to organize, expedite, and coordinate the work of fulfilling those tasks.

The objectives of Reorganization Plan No. 6 were spelled out in more detail in a regulation issued by the Secretary of Defense on July 26, 1954, shortly after the questionnaire data presented below had been collected.⁴ This regulation directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including its entire substructure of committees, divisions, groups, and staffs, to collaborate fully, and at the early stages of staff work, with appropriate civilian officials, especially those serving the several Assistant Secretaries of Defense. The directive also strengthened the position of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The management function that he had previously exercised with respect to the Joint Staff was extended to embrace JCS committees and subcommittees. His authority to approve the nomination of officers for duty with JCS agencies was clarified by designation of the specific positions to which it applied.⁵ It was also directed that all personnel would be selected "with due regard for their . . . ability to subordinate special service interests. . . ."

² See National Security Act Amendments of August 10, 1949 (63 Stat. 578). The position of Under Secretary of Defense was created by an amendment of April 2, 1949 (63 Stat. 30). See also, Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (Hoover Commission), *Task Force Report on National Security Organization*, November 13, 1948; *The National Security Organization*, February 15, 1949.

³ 67 Stat. 638. Just as the 1949 amendments were based largely on the Hoover Commission study, so Reorganization Plan No. 6 followed closely recommendations made by the Rockefeller Committee. See *Report of the Rockefeller Committee on Department of Defense Organization*, April 11, 1953, Senate Committee Print, 83rd Cong.,

1st sess. Reorganization Plan No. 6 was transmitted to Congress April 30, 1953, and became effective June 30, 1953.

⁴ Department of Defense Directive No. 5158.1.

⁵ For example, the Deputy Directors of the Joint Staff for Plans, Logistics, Intelligence, and Subsidiary Plans; all members of the Strategic Survey Committee, the Advanced Study Committee, and the Chairman's Staff Group; the Representative for NSC Affairs; the Senior Member of the UN Military Staff; and the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

II

THUS, in comparatively few years significant changes have been made in military organizational structure. Fighting services, steeped in their own traditions, alive to their institutional interests, and possessing the special social cohesion that a combat mission generates, have been subordinated in some degree to agencies explicitly designed to decrease their autonomy.

And yet unification is far from total. Much of the traditional structure has necessarily been preserved. Moreover, in the same period many forces have operated to divide rather than to unite the services. Budget retrenchment has made military officers highly sensitive to the growth of central staff controls in the Department of Defense. It has alerted each service to the need for officers who understand its interests and who are capable of "bringing home the bacon." The continual development of radically new weapons has generated much debate over which service shall have them and for what purposes. Officers recognize that decisions on this issue may determine not only their respective shares of the next budget but in the long run the importance of their service, and perhaps its very survival as an independent institution.⁶

Congress and the public have also laid restraining hands on more ardent unifiers. Fear of the "German general staff system" or of pyramided bureaucracies has been expressed when suggestions have been advanced to divorce high-ranking military officers from their services and constitute them as a military staff for the Secretary of Defense.⁷ Legislators, interest groups, and even executive officials often feel they can exercise more influence over military policy if they are free to deal with the

constituent elements of a loosely organized military establishment than if they are forced to approach the top officers of a tightly centralized department. The stakes for which these civilian forces play can be very high indeed, extending to the foreign policy of the nation or the size of its annual budget, and in many cases the civilian can acquire knowledge of significant policy alternatives only if a certain amount of service autonomy and rivalry is permitted to exist.

It is therefore not surprising that unification is incomplete; that at each stage advocates of more radical change have been beaten down; that some recommendations made as early as 1948 were not effected until 1954 or have not been effected at all; and that a greater degree of unification has been achieved within some parts of the defense structure than within others. It is this last point that is most important for present purposes; for it may plausibly be supposed that officers in organizations that have achieved different degrees of unification will have different views regarding the personal skills and attitudes most needed in their jobs.

III

IT is obvious that unification has been carried farthest in the OSD, less far in the Joint Staff, and least far in the service headquarters. This situation simply reflects the distinctive function of each of these organizations in the Department of Defense. The service headquarters is responsible for the development, execution, and, if necessary, defense of service policy. It is basically service-oriented. It is staffed almost exclusively by officers of its own service. The Joint Staff, on the other hand, has the difficult task of blending the views of three services and resolving their differences as best it can. Its decisions strongly influence the division of dollars and weapons among the three services. In making these decisions it relies upon a staff that by law is composed of officers of each of the three services in approximately equal numbers. The Office of the Secretary of Defense likewise participates in the process of resolving interservice issues, but it has the additional functions of coordinating military with nonmilitary aspects of defense policy and of marketing the Defense Depart-

⁶ This is well illustrated in the debates that raged throughout 1949 over the Air Force's B-36 procurement program and the Navy's plan to construct a supercarrier. See *The National Defense Program—Unification and Strategy*, Hearings before House Armed Services Committee, 81st Cong., 1st sess., October 6-21, 1949. See also House Doc. 600, 81st Cong., 2d sess., March 1, 1950.

⁷ The National Security Act of 1947 explicitly prohibits the Secretary of Defense from creating his own military staff. Assignments to his office, like those to the Joint Staff and to service headquarters, are for strictly limited periods of time, generally ranging from two to a maximum of four years.

ment product to other agencies and branches of the government. It is staffed by officers from each of the three services and by civilians.

Thus as one moves from service headquarters to the Joint Staff to the OSD the pattern of personal relationships in which the officer is involved becomes increasingly complex. One consequence, according to testimony supplied by the officers in our sample, is that *personal skills* (e.g. ability to work with other people or to adjust rapidly to changing situations) come to be valued more highly than *substantive knowledge* (e.g. of economic, diplomatic, or scientific data). At the OSD level a premium is placed on human relations skills, presumably because service at that level involves the officer in a highly complicated, changing, and largely unstructured system of interaction with officers of the three services and with civilians operating in numerous agencies at the highest levels of government. By contrast, officers assigned to service headquarters value substantive knowledge more than officers at the other levels and tend to be "task oriented" rather than "human relations" oriented.⁸

Differences in the extent of unification are revealed not only by the distinctive missions and staffing practices of all three levels but also by the different systems of authority and influence to which personnel are subjected at each level. Authority over officers assigned to a serv-

ice headquarters is vested in a single military officer, the chief of service. Authority over officers assigned to the Joint Staff is shared by an interservice committee (JCS) and its chairman. Authority over officers assigned to OSD is exercised by a civilian.

In service headquarters effectiveness or efficiency reports are almost invariably made out by officers of the same service as the officer being rated. On the Joint Staff it is the practice that whenever possible the rating officer should belong to the same service as the officer being rated. In OSD officers are rated by their immediate superiors, who may be civilians, officers of another service, or officers of the same service.⁹ In contrast to the Joint Staff, no special attempt is made to insure that the immediate superior is of the same service as the officer being rated. As a consequence, 68 per cent of the officers in the Joint Staff sample said that their effectiveness reports were prepared and signed by officers of their own service; only 34 per cent of the officers in the OSD sample made such a statement.

Clearly, the sanctioning power with respect to officers assigned to both service headquarters and the Joint Staff rests in the hands of senior officers of their own service. But in the OSD the sanctioning power has to a considerable extent been removed from an officer's own service.

On the Joint Staff the influence of parent services is also built into the structure through a system of review committees. Recommendations prepared by a functional subdivision of the Joint Staff (e.g., by its Logistics Plans Group) do not ordinarily go directly up to the Joint Chiefs. They go first to a "counterpart" committee composed principally of logisticians assigned to *headquarters* of each of the three services. This structural arrangement may introduce a necessary element of realism into planning since the representatives of the services are more thoroughly informed of operational matters within their own services. However, the arrangement also makes an officer on the Joint Staff keenly aware of any discrepancies that may exist between his "joint" position and the view that his parent service is taking on a particular issue. The following in-

⁸ All officers were asked this question: *Generally speaking, do you feel that substantive knowledge or personal skill is more important in this type of work?*

The percentages choosing personal skill were as follows (numbers in parentheses):

	Navy	Army	Air Force
OSD	55 (33)	51 (53)	50(30)
Joint Staff	24 (33)	34 (38)	39(36)
Service headquarters	18(123)	34(106)	33(94)

Evidence that this tendency for increasing emphasis on personal skill at the higher levels within the Defense Department is related to the increasing complexity of interpersonal relations comes from the fact that in each service headquarters, officers serving on committees with civilians or officers from another service placed relatively greater premium on personal skill than officers lacking such assignments. Percentages choosing personal skill were as follows:

	Navy	Army	Air Force
Headquarters personnel			
On committees with civilians	33	47	54
Lacking such assignments	16	35	33

⁹ Defense Department Directive No. 1320.3, August 4, 1955.

interview comment by a Navy officer on the Joint Staff illustrates the problem:

When, for example, the Joint Strategic Plans Committee reviews a paper prepared by the Joint Strategic Plans Group, the "Indian" who had primary responsibility for handling the matter within the Group accompanies his Group Chief to the meeting of the Committee. He sits there while officers of his own service on the Committee are cross-examining his Group Chief. Those officers soon discover whether he has advised his Chief to take a position that diverges from their service's position. In order to do his duty he may feel compelled to diverge from his service's position, but this fact can be quickly reported to his service headquarters.

Although it is clear that an officer assigned to the Joint Staff may be influenced by his service's position, JCS administrative regulations state explicitly that "staff officers of the JCS will consider themselves as impartial representatives of the Department of Defense with specialized service background rather than as representatives of their respective Military Departments."¹⁰ Evidence will be presented below to show that the great majority of Joint Staff officers do, in fact, subscribe to the values promulgated in these regulations. They do value highly an impartial point of view. But enough has been said to suggest that these men, whose organization is in an intermediate stage of unification, may also be faced with a serious personal dilemma, or, to use the language of one of them, may be "put in a bind." The "joint" values of the organization are clearly proclaimed in the statement that an officer must consider himself an "impartial representative of the Department of Defense" and in other regulations. Yet the more he fulfills the Joint Staff requirement for an impartial point of view, the greater the risk of incurring the disfavor of his own service.¹¹

¹⁰ Abstract of General Policies Governing Officers Assigned to Joint Chiefs of Staff Committees and Agencies.

¹¹ The consequences of this situation were graphically suggested by Secretary of Defense Lovett in a letter to the President shortly before he left office. He declared: "By their very makeup, it is extremely difficult for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to maintain a broad non-service point of view. . . . It is difficult for them to detach themselves from the hopes and ambitions of their own service without having their own staff feel that they are being let down by their chief. The maintenance of an impartial, non-partisan position becomes increasingly

IV

AS ONE would expect from the foregoing account of functions and structures, there are sharp differences in the degree of acceptance of "joint" values at the service headquarters and at the OSD-Joint Staff level. Officers in the OSD and the Joint Staff are almost unanimous in their adherence to what Secretary Lovett called the "broad nonservice" view. Each officer was asked this question:

In a job like yours, which of these two officers would contribute more to the fulfillment of the mission of this organization—one who vigorously supports the views of his own service or one who is receptive to the views of other services, even to the extent of sometimes compromising the viewpoint of his own service?

The percentages saying the one receptive to the views of other services were: OSD, 97; Joint Staff, 96; and service headquarters, 49.

Equally sharp differences appear in answer to this question:

In a job like yours, which of these two officers would contribute more to the fulfillment of the mission of this organization—one who vigorously supports the views of his own service or one who is receptive to the views of civilian government officials, even to the extent of sometimes compromising the viewpoint of his own service?

The percentages saying the one receptive to views of civilians were: OSD, 86; Joint Staff, 78; and service headquarters, 46.

At each of the three levels, compromise with other services is more highly valued than compromise with civilians. And while OSD and Joint Staff officers are alike in their almost unanimous vote for compromise with other

difficult in times of shortage of either men, money or materiel. . . . The broad national service point of view, as compared with the single service point of view, is not merely a problem of the individuals making up the joint chiefs of staff, but is more likely in the joint staff which prepared the papers and submits the analyses and studies to the joint chiefs of staff. . . . They are of relatively junior grade and their future careers and promotions lie in their separate services. It is not unnatural, therefore, that they should from time to time become advocates of their own service point of view." Department of Defense Press Release, January 8, 1954.

services, OSD officers rate compromise with civilian officials higher than do Joint Staff officers. Service headquarters officers are much more likely to place a high value on adherence to the service position.

Differences in the degree of acceptance of the "broad nonservice" point of view are reflected also in differences in evaluation of joint and service war colleges. The National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces include among their students officers from each of the three services and civilians representing a number of government agencies. They were created during the unification movement and one of their principal aims was to inculcate a "joint approach." The service war colleges tend, in contrast, to reflect the values and traditions of the particular service and to intensify loyalty thereto. It is not surprising that officers in joint assignments place a higher value on joint war college training than officers assigned at service headquarters. Officers were asked this question:

In preparing officers for the duties of your organization, which one of the following schools, so far as you have been able to observe, seems to do the best job?

The percentages giving various answers and the number answering were:

	Percentage			
	No. Answer	Service War Col.	Joint War Col.	No. Answering
OSD	22	13	65	116
Joint Staff	23	14	63	107
Service headquarters	24	41	35	323

While two-thirds of all OSD and Joint Staff officers prefer joint college training to service college training, only one-third of service headquarters officers indicate preference for joint college training. These differences remain when analysis is limited to those officers who have not themselves attended a joint or service war college. Those assigned to the OSD or the Joint Staff again value joint college training more highly than officers assigned to service headquarters.

These data show clearly that OSD and Joint Staff officers place a much higher value on the "broad nonservice" approach than officers as-

signed to service headquarters. Joint roles demand joint values and officers filling these roles subscribe to joint values.

V

SO FAR, the data have been used to illustrate differences between service headquarters, Joint Staff, and OSD personnel. But the responses also show significant differences among Army, Naval, and Air Force officers in the acceptance of joint values. It seems reasonable that the degree to which a given service will accept unification will vary, at least in part, with whether it expects to gain or lose as a result of unification, or to put it another way, with whether it expects to be able to hold its own in a joint forum. Because the process of unification has been paralleled by the rise of the Air Force, which has received a growing share of defense appropriations relative to the Navy, one might predict that Air Force officers would subscribe more strongly to the "broad nonservice" point of view and that Navy officers would manifest some resistance to it.¹²


The data provide some evidence in support of this hypothesis. Roughly half of all headquarters officers in the sample report that the officer who is "receptive to the views of other services" would contribute more than the officer who "vigorously supports the views of his own service." But in Air Force headquarters, 60 per cent favor the "broad nonservice" approach over the service approach, whereas in Navy headquarters only 41 per cent favor the joint approach. Army headquarters officers fall between Navy and Air Force officers, with 47 per cent favoring receptivity to the views of other services.

We can again test our hypothesis that Air Force officers place a higher, and Navy officers a lower, value on the "broad nonservice" point of view by examining differences in the evaluation of joint and service war colleges at each

¹² From 1950 to 1954, the Air Force share of the defense appropriation increased from 32.7 to 39.3 per cent, the Navy's share decreased from 35.1 to 28.3 per cent, and the Army's share decreased from 34.1 to 32.4 per cent. In fiscal year 1956 it is estimated that the Air Force share will be 45.7 per cent, the Navy's 28.4 per cent, and the Army's 25.9 per cent. President's Budget Message, January 17, 1955.

FIGURE 1

Rating by Officers of Various Services at Various Structural Levels of Service and Joint War Colleges, by Percentage and Number



level. Figure 1 shows that at all three structural levels, Air Force officers place the highest value on joint war college training and Navy officers place the lowest.

To summarize, officers in the OSD and on the Joint Staff subscribe to joint values, whereas officers at service headquarters subscribe to service values. Officers in the Air Force subscribe most strongly to joint values, whereas officers in the Navy subscribe most strongly to service values. At service headquarters—and particularly Navy headquarters—most officers do not subscribe to the “broad nonservice” point of view. The officer who “vigorously supports the point of view of his own service” is highly valued, an attitude that is to be expected. Each service headquarters is charged with determining its own needs. The particular service interest is paramount. At the Joint Staff the needs of all are weighed. But the service interest continues to manifest itself, and if the Joint Staff officer errs on the side of compromise with other services, his own service is not without remedies should it care to exercise them. Representatives from his service headquarters sit on committees that assess his recommendations. Senior officers of his service sitting on the Joint Staff may review his effectiveness report.

VI

THUS at the present stage in the process of unification, the separate services retain means of exerting powerful influence over officers filling roles in a structure designed to compromise service differences. Whether they exert this influence or not is not as important as what officers believe to be the case. Many officers in the sample believe that they *do* exert this influence.

All officers were asked this question:

In a job like yours, which of these two officers would stand the better chance of promotion? One who vigorously supports the viewpoint of his own service or one who is receptive to the views of other services, even to the extent of sometimes compromising the viewpoint of his own service.

The percentages giving various answers and the number answering were:

	Percentage			Number Answering
	No Answer	One who vigorously supports own service	One who is receptive to other services	
OSD	17	33	50	116
Joint Staff	14	45	41	107
Service headquarters	16	58	26	323

Half of the OSD officers believe that the officer with "joint" values stands the better chance of promotion. Two-fifths of the Joint Staff officers believe that the joint-oriented officer has the better chance. Only one-fourth of the headquarters officers feel that the officer with the "broad nonservice" approach stands the better chance. As we move from OSD down to headquarters, the perceived reward for joint values falls. On the Joint Staff, the "broad nonservice" point of view is believed to be rewarded more than it is at service headquarters but less than it is at OSD.

We know that virtually all of the officers assigned to the Joint Staff themselves subscribe to an impartial point of view. They feel that this approach is essential to fulfillment of the mission of the Joint Staff. Yet nearly half of them believe that the officer who "vigorously supports the point of view of his own service" stands the better chance of promotion. These officers face a serious personal dilemma.

The proportion of officers in this dilemma is higher on the Joint Staff than it is in OSD or service headquarters. Forty-two per cent of the officers on the Joint Staff subscribe to joint values yet also feel that service values are rewarded. Only 32 per cent of the OSD officers are in this dilemma, and only 20 per cent of the headquarters officers experience it. There is a maladjustment on the Joint Staff between perceived requirements for successful performance and the perceived system of rewards. The role demands the "broad nonservice" point of view, the role to which incumbents adhere. Yet it is felt that rewards go to the officer with the service point of view.

Many officers on the Joint Staff, however, escape this dilemma and say that the "broad nonservice" point of view is not only warranted but rewarded. If the dilemma is produced by service influence over effectiveness reports, we would predict that a relatively large number of those who do escape it are rated by officers of other services.

The data confirm this prediction: 60 per cent of those Joint Staff officers with an immediate superior from their own service say the officer who "vigorously supports the views of his own service" stands the better chance of promotion. But only 30 per cent of those reporting to an officer from a service other than

their own say the officer who "vigorously supports the views of his own service" stands the better chance of promotion.¹³

The responses also reveal contrasting attitudes toward duty within the three types of organizations. If Joint Staff officers have a relatively strong fear that they may jeopardize their own chances for promotion by holding attitudes that contribute to the fulfillment of the unit mission, they should resist specialization in such a unit more than officers at OSD or service headquarters. The data suggest that on the whole they do resist specialization more, though in the case of the Army officers the difference is not significant.

With respect to the career development of officers, do you favor specialization in this type of duty?

The percentages opposing any specialization whatever were:

	Navy	Army	Air Force
OSD	49	41	30
Joint Staff	55	42	42
Service headquarters	50	40	25

This finding is confirmed by answers to another question: *Did you seek this type of assignment?* Within all three services the proportion answering "no" was greatest among officers assigned to the Joint Staff.

VII

THIS study indicates that officers assigned to the Joint Staff and to OSD share the "broad nonservice" values required in joint and national planning of defense policy. It also indicates that supporting institutional arrangements are not believed to be wholly in keeping with the required values. The felt lag in the adjustment of the sanctions system to the required values is clearly demonstrated in the responses of the Joint Staff officers. The work of these officers could surely be made less frustrating if they were more certain that their careers were being advanced.

¹³ The greater tendency for the officer reporting to another officer from his own service to say that adherence to the "service line" is rewarded holds up separately for each service at both the Joint Staff and OSD levels. It also holds up when the effect of rank—positively correlated with the tendency to say that adherence to the "service line" is rewarded—is held constant.

The Prestige of Federal Employment

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THERE are many evidences that contribute to the conclusion that the federal government is in an unfavorable employment position for administrative and professional personnel.

In 1954 the number of applicants for the Junior Management Assistant examination for the federal civil service had decreased to less than 50 per cent of the applicants in 1950. Frederick and Edith Mosher, in speaking of executives and administrators, and scientists and professional people, at both the junior and the senior levels, observe, "It is hard to escape the general conclusion that, among the potential employees in these categories, the Federal drawing power is not high and is on the decline."¹ Henry Reining, Jr., writing from California, has discussed the appeal of the federal civil service to students in these words: "... our public administration students are not taking the JMA examination, because not only is the prestige of Federal employment at a currently-low ebb, but also the jobs at home have become increasingly attractive. . . ."²

This situation in federal employment is not new except in degree. However, the level to which federal employment prestige has dropped indicates a critical condition that will have an increasingly deleterious effect on the quality of federal administration.

We have sufficient research data to move fully into planning both short- and long-range action programs to improve the federal em-

ployment position. In the effort to achieve more effective government through improvement in the employment situation it is important to attract more high quality applicants for federal employment, to reduce the turnover rate, and to improve the general desirability of federal service which is, of course, inextricably related to employment and turnover.

The object of this article is to suggest basic trends in and factors contributing to the present situation and to make suggestions for improvement. Although recent developments such as the changes in the JMA and Foreign Service recruiting programs seem to be constructive, they need to be evaluated against the backdrop of a long-range program based on the facts of federal employment prestige.

Background for Federal Employment Planning Results of Research

LEONARD D. WHITE conducted surveys of public attitudes toward government employment in 1927-28 and 1931.³ These surveys showed that the prestige value of the public service was lower than that of private employment and that among professional groups the prestige value of the public service was particularly low. In his report of the second study, Mr. White commented: "The primary value of a high prestige attaching to public employment is that it predisposes young men and women of the greatest promise to seek a permanent connection in government circles." He suggested also that a favorable prestige situation reduces employee turnover among

¹ Frederick and Edith Mosher, "Distinguishing Marks of the Federal Government Service," in *The Federal Government Service: Its Character, Prestige, and Problems*, a report of the American Assembly (Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, 1954), p. 147.

² Henry Reining, Jr., "JMA versus Jobs at Home," 18 *Personnel Administration* 11 (March, 1955).

³ *The Prestige Value of Public Employment in Chicago* (University of Chicago Press, 1929), 183 pp. and *Further Contributions to the Prestige Value of Public Employment* (University of Chicago Press, 1932), 88 pp.

the best qualified and stimulates better performance generally among employees.

The American University undertook studies in 1950-51 and 1951-52 for the Office of Naval Research to determine the attitudes of college seniors toward federal employment.⁴ In these studies college students were queried about their attitudes toward federal government and industrial employment and also about their sources of information concerning employment opportunities and the sources of influence in making job choices. Attitudes of faculty and placement officers were solicited and analyzed because of their potential importance in influencing the decisions of students.

Both studies revealed a distinct preference for industrial employment over federal employment among students in several college majors. Engineering majors were most favorable toward industry, science majors were less favorable, and social science majors least favorable among the three categories of majors. However, social science majors as a group favored industry over government.

Students were also asked to judge whether government employment or industrial employment was preferable in terms of specific factors that had been found important to students in making job choices. The ten factors in which students considered industry more favorable than government were:

1. Pay for higher level positions
2. Students with greatest ability more likely to enter
3. Incentive for employee to work
4. Students more inclined to work for industry
5. General management efficiency
6. Pay dependent upon ability
7. Management efficiency in my field
8. Employee works harder
9. General professional development
10. Competent immediate supervisors.

⁴ Full reports of the studies are contained in George P. Bush, *Engineering Students and Federal Employment* (The American University, 1951), 145 pp., and Charles M. Hersh, *College Seniors and Federal Employment* (The American University, 1953), 123 pp.

For summaries of the studies see George P. Bush and Lowell H. Hattery, "Federal Recruitment of Junior Engineers," 114 *Science* 455-458 (November, 1951), and Lowell H. Hattery and Charles M. Hersh, "Attitudes of College Seniors toward Federal and Industrial Employment," 120 *Science* 12-14 (July 2, 1954).

The ten factors in which students considered government more favorable than industry were:

1. Individual works "under pressure" less frequently
2. Experience good recommendation for future work in industry
3. Liberal vacation policy
4. Liberal sick leave policy
5. Beneficial retirement system
6. Job security
7. Equipment for technical work
8. Discrimination against individual less likely
9. Geographic location of positions
10. Employment more likely to be permanent.

Students were also asked to indicate the factors they considered most important in job choice. In general, students considered of most importance these factors in which they rated industry highest and of least importance the factors in which they rated government highest.

Additional findings showed that students considered the company or agency representative who visited the college campus and interviewed students, faculty members, and family as the most important sources of advice in job choice. On the basis of statements by placement officers, industrial recruiters seemed to have been better organized and prepared for their campus visits. Studies of faculty attitudes also showed favor toward industry although in a less degree than among their students.

Although publicity has been given to problems of federal employee security investigations for several years, their impact on recruitment was apparently not important as late as 1952. In the ensuing years, however, with several dramatic and controversial cases such as that of J. Robert Oppenheimer, the factor of federal loyalty and security investigations has probably become a significant deterrent to federal employment. With the recent more judicious approach that has been taken toward these matters by Congress, the administration, and other leaders there is hopeful indication of reaching a balance between the needs of national security and the protection of the individual, of which prospective federal employees will become aware. The continuous extension of security measures to industrial and academic activities also tends to eliminate

this factor as a differential between public and private employment.

Other sources of information tend to support the findings in The American University's studies, which were little different from the findings of Leonard White twenty-five years ago. A study of graduating seniors at the University of Washington shows that the type of work (work which is interesting and well liked), advancement (opportunity for promotion), and human relations (good relations with supervisors, coworkers, etc.) are the most important factors to students in their decision on job choice after graduation.⁵

Studies of persons who have left federal service indicate that the kind of work, human relations, and the challenge of the work are among the less important reasons for scientists and engineers leaving federal employment. The most important factors are desire for better pay and the location of work.⁶

Available facts such as those described above seem sufficiently reliable and complete to provide a basis for planning the substantial public relations and recruitment programs for federal employment that are so critically needed.

Factors Influencing Students

Employment policies should take into account the factors in their environment that influence students in choosing employment. The American University studies especially provide information about the influences on student preferences. Faculty personnel were found to be second only in influence to recruitment representatives. Faculty members should thus become a most important public for federal officials interested in successful federal employment programs. Federal agencies should establish continuous, direct liaison with faculty members to keep them informed concerning the nature of employment opportunities in general, and specific examination and job opportunities.

⁵ Carl M. Dickinson, "The Relative Importance of Job Factors to College Graduates and Employers," 14 *Journal of College Placement* 25 (October, 1953).

⁶ Clark D. Ahlberg and John C. Honey, *Attitudes of Scientists and Engineers About Their Government Employment*, Volume I (Syracuse University, 1950), 223 pp.

Misconceptions about Federal Employment

There are many evidences of popular misconceptions concerning federal employment. The American University studies revealed, for example, that among both students and faculty the role of political influence in federal employment was widely misunderstood.

The publicity given to controversies over federal political patronage and the general practice of patronage in many local governments apparently had given many prospective employees the idea that federal jobs generally are patronage controlled rather than civil service controlled. Another misconception was that the variety of engineering job opportunities in government is restricted. Many students held this opinion.

Perhaps the most important misconception is the belief that the federal government is much less efficient than industry. There are several obvious reasons for this misconception. The first, already referred to, is the lack of understanding of the difference in objectives and responsibilities of government and industry arising from the nature of government, its relationships, its obligations, and its accountability to the people. The second reason is the amount and kind of publicity concerning government operations in the press. This publicity is usually built around conflict, and it follows that feature stories on government boondoggles greatly outnumber feature stories on government efficiencies.

Several matters cause management and professional publics, especially, to consider government less efficient than industry. One is the legal restriction on the use of the stop watch for time and motion studies at arsenals and shipyards, which was in effect from 1919 to 1949.⁷ This was a popular topic of discussion among private management specialists and a clinching argument on the inefficiencies of governmental management. Another factor has been the notorious difficulty in removing federal employees, a reputation not entirely justified, especially if one compares difficulties in removing employees in large industry. Still another factor is the reputed influence of political considerations in personnel appointments, promotions, and removals and the fail-

⁷ See, for example, 62 *Stat.* 595.

ure to recognize that the safeguards of the merit system protect employees against political and personal whims.

Although the issue of relative efficiency is not likely to be resolved, there is substantial evidence and testimony to support the thesis that, if the different objectives and responsibilities of the two institutions are taken into account, the federal government is comparable in efficiency to industry. Many persons with experience both in business and in government, including management consultants and management specialists, contend that in efficiency of individual performance and management efficiency the government is equal or superior to industry. For example, Secretary of the Treasury George M. Humphrey in recent hearings before Congress paid tribute to Treasury employees when he said, "I will stack up the Treasury team as individuals with the organization of any business in America, job for job."⁸

In 1952 Robert Ramspeck, as chairman of the Civil Service Commission, conducted what the *New York Times* described as a "legitimate, one-man campaign to bring about a better understanding of the status, role and achievements of Government workers designed to offset the unjust and meat-axe criticism of the Federal employee."⁹ This campaign died out swiftly after Mr. Ramspeck left the commission. It remains for someone with the insight and honesty and conviction of Clarence Randall, chairman of the board of Inland Steel Company, to help fill the void, as he writes in *Life* of his experience in federal service, "I found at every level in government, from those bearing the highest responsibility down to devoted secretaries, individuals whose unselfish dedication to the service of the U. S. was an inspiration." He adds that the hours of work by many government employees "make many businesses look like a vacation."¹⁰

⁸ U. S. Congress. House Subcommittee on Treasury-Post Office Departments Appropriations of the Committee on Appropriations. *Hearings . . . 84th Cong., 1st sess.* (Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 32.

⁹ See addresses by Chairman Robert Ramspeck issued by the Civil Service Commission in press releases dated February 7, March 19, March 27, April 17, April 22, May 1, and June 21, 1952.

¹⁰ Clarence Randall, "A Good Word for Washington," *Life*, April 4, 1955, pp. 144, 147.

The testimony of Secretary Humphrey and Mr. Randall should be joined with that of many others to provide to the public the true picture of their public service. Substantial responsibility in this matter rests with federal personnel officials.

Government Public Relations

MANY of the misconceptions and other factors which contribute to the low prestige of federal employment may be attributed to poor public relations. Federal government public relations have been leaderless, confused in objective, and harassed by Congress. From time to time, an individual public relations official or an individual executive or an administrative agency may develop a constructive, long-range public relations program that takes into consideration the needs of the people for proper public reporting and the needs of the agency for public understanding of the agency's program and administration. Government public relations, set within this frame of reference, avoids the criticism Congress levels at the "high pressure" propaganda type of public relations. It cues public relations activities into a common objective of a better informed public and a sounder public service on which the executive branch, the Congress, and the people can agree.

Public relations on personnel matters is an important area of general government public relations, and although from time to time the Civil Service Commission and individual federal agencies have produced fine examples of public relations actions in the personnel field, the general picture is not favorable. For example, the public relations on the Junior Management Assistant examination seems to have been negative in its total effect. The extremely high selectivity of the examination, based in large part on an oral interview which students do not fully understand, has resulted in a prevalent skepticism on college campuses about applying for this and other federal examinations. The decrease in the number of applicants is probably due in large part to the poor public relations for the examination.

There are many ways in which public relations in personnel matters may be improved. For example, a notice of failure to outstanding students who have passed the written examina-

tion but have failed to convince a lay examining committee in an oral interview is shocking and disillusioning, not only to the student himself but to his fellow students who know of his outstanding ability. If these students who obviously have sufficient ability to be used somewhere in the federal service could be put on a "reserve register" for possible use in other than JMA executive training programs, public relations for the examination would be much improved.

Principles in Planning an Improved Program

EFFECTIVE planning requires vigorous adherence to several important principles which may be applied to the current problem of federal recruitment and the prestige of federal employment. The following are suggested as being especially significant here.

1. Take all available relevant facts into account. Background studies, examination results, agency personnel needs—these are some of the facts.

2. Plan long-range. Then propose a short-range plan to (a) meet present needs and (b) contribute to the achievement of the long-range plan.

3. Consider sub-problems in the context of basic objectives. A sub-problem solved out of context may aggravate the basic problem. For example, the procedure for the JMA examination has been successful in the selection of a limited number of high-grade, high-potential junior administrators. On the other hand, the recruitment and examining procedures seem to have resulted in a reduced general interest among college seniors in federal employment.

4. Recognize the importance of continuity of service in the same job or the same organization to provide for continuity of long-range planning and action. Often employee turnover neutralizes efforts at "follow through."

5. Draw appropriate congressional committees into planning. Individual members of Congress may want a reduction in total administrative personnel, but they do not want inferior personnel.

6. Give special attention to planning relationships with influential publics. In the case of student recruitment, faculty members seem clearly to constitute a most important influential public. For advanced administrative and professional personnel, the influential public may be professional associations. For nonprofessional personnel—clerical and blue collar groups—it may be the general public. Recruitment in student and professional categories constitutes the most critical problem. This

fact would seem to mean that special public relations can be planned for publics conveniently restricted in size and distribution.

Although objectives for planning can be set only by the government and its agencies, an observer may suggest a certain ordering of objectives. First, the federal government should attempt to recruit the best possible manpower for its responsibilities. This objective is different from the "fair-share" philosophy which assumes that manpower and talent should be shared by government and nongovernment in a ratio equal to that of jobs to be filled.

Second, the federal government should engage in a long-range program of "low-pressure" public relations designed to give specialized publics, including prospective employees and the general public, a true perspective of public administration and of federal career opportunities.

General Recommendations for Action

1. *Long-range planning.* Planning for federal recruitment should be based on forecasts of personnel needs far into the future. These forecasts should be accompanied by an analysis of the outlook for labor supply to fill these needs.

As a most important part of long-range planning, public attitudes and cultural influences should be analyzed and studied continuously, using the data summarized above as a point of departure. Public relations and recruitment policies and programs should be planned on a long-range schedule, taking into consideration the prevailing cultural influences on the publics significant to successful federal employment programs.

2. *Participation in planning.* Ultimate responsibility for meeting problems of employment lies with top management. In the federal government this responsibility lies with the Executive Office of the President, including the White House itself. The responsibility is shared by the Civil Service Commission and all federal agencies.

Long-range planning should enlist the participation of line as well as staff officials, and of field as well as headquarters officials. The thinking of federal officials should be supplemented with advice from universities and

other interested sources that may have information, points of view, and perspectives important to planning.

Specific Recommendations for Action

1. *Liaison with colleges and universities and other educational institutions.* Because of the number of persons recruited directly from educational institutions and because of the present unfavorable attitudes of university and college faculty toward federal employment, it is important that the federal government establish better and continuous liaison with educational institutions, particularly members of their faculties. Field offices for college relations might be established. Faculty members should be kept informed of pending examinations; they should also be informed about the general nature of federal employment, its advantages and disadvantages, and about prospective employment needs.

Faculty members should be encouraged to visit government installations and to accept summer or other temporary or part-time government assignments. These measures are likely to develop more favorable attitudes on the part of faculty members and certainly they will provide them with more factual information that they can pass on to their students.

2. *Reports of management improvement.* Public administrators have been remiss in reporting their accomplishments in management improvement through professional journals and the public press. Official encouragement should be given to individual authorship of articles or other publications describing management improvements.

3. *Liberal use of vacation work appointments.* It has been found both in industry and in government that summer work appointments for students result in more favorable attitudes toward the employing institution as a place for employment after graduation. Although some federal agencies have had such programs, notably the National Bureau of Standards which has an outstanding record, they can and should be introduced much more extensively.

4. *Client-conscientiousness.* A government-wide program to stimulate client-conscientiousness on the part of federal employees can be an important public relations device. It is

so easy for the public servant to forget that his responsibility is to serve the people that he needs to be reminded through some systematic means. The attitudes of many persons toward the federal government derive primarily from their experience in direct and correspondence contacts with individual federal employees. If these employees are courteous and helpful and are aware of their role as servants of the people, citizen attitudes to government will be more favorable.

5. *Trained staff for personnel relations with professional employees.* Staff personnel officers should be selected and trained for competency in personal negotiations with prospective professional employees and professional employees on the job. The emphasis in the federal government on personnel administration by regulation has resulted in a de-emphasis on the human relations aspects of personnel administration. The human relations element is important to successful personnel administration for professional employees.

6. *Development of professional associations within government.* A research report by The Professional Engineers Conference Board for Industry revealed that most engineers employed by industry "feel they would benefit by belonging to a nonbargaining, interplant organization which would serve as a vehicle of expression and a means of communication."¹¹ The establishment of organizations that represent the common interests of professional personnel would seem to be important in internal relations; such organizations would also result in favorable external public relations with others in the same professional fields. Professional organizations of federal employees already exist in several fields. The Federal Government Accountants Association is an example.

7. *Medals and other awards.* The award of medals or other recognition for outstanding career contributions can be an effective public relations device. Such recognition will also give confidence to prospective employees that their contributions to the federal organization will be recognized and rewarded. Few persons

¹¹ The Professional Engineers Conference Board for Industry, *How to Attract and Hold Engineering Talent: A Report on Executive Research Survey Number Three* (The Conference, 1954), p. 46.

are so selfless that public recognition of performance is not an important motivation. Well administered incentive awards are also an important means of strengthening the federal personnel program.

8. *Central management research and aid.* The central agencies of the federal government cannot divest themselves of responsibility for the quality of administrative performance in the departments and other agencies, no matter what the degree of decentralization of authority and function. A vitalized program of management aid to the constituent departments and agencies should be developed by the Executive Office of the President and perhaps the Civil Service Commission. In such a program substantial research in personnel administration and other phases of public administration should be carried on. For example, the installation and operation of automation systems involves so many organization and management unknowns that the federal agencies would be well served by a central research project on this subject.

Results of studies made by a central management research unit could be transmitted to all federal agencies with inestimable savings in dollars and services. Such a service should also provide a central exchange of experience and

research in the agencies for the benefit of the entire government.

The results of a central program of aid and research would be effective both internally and externally. Internally, the quality of management would be improved. Externally, the reputation of the federal government as a well-managed institution would be enhanced with various important publics, among them prospective employees.

In Conclusion

STAFFING the 5.3-million-man civilian-military federal government deserves our best thinking and efforts. Many individuals have devoted earnest thought and work to this problem and have made important contributions toward its solution. Officials of the Civil Service Commission are making substantial progress.

Action along a broad front is needed, however, with leadership from the Executive Office of the President and the cooperation of the Congress and the executive agencies. Imaginative boldness, a sense of the significance of the problem, impatience with the present but patience to plan and work toward goals three, five, ten, twenty years ahead—these are qualities necessary to achieve important, basic improvements.

The Values of Prestige

Intangible though it is, prestige is a commodity of value in the art of management. Fundamentally management is the manipulation of external conditions and of individual and group attitudes for the purpose of securing and maintaining a social-psychological situation favorable to the accomplishment of the end sought by the organization. . . . Prestige is one of the attitudes which may help or hinder the task of management.

The primary value of a high prestige attaching to public employment is that it predisposes young men and women of the greatest promise to seek a permanent connection in government circles. . . .

A favorable prestige situation is also a helpful element in retaining the best qualified men and women in the public service. . . .

Finally, a high prestige is one of the guaranties of a high order of performance. Here prestige and morale approach each other to sustain the operating record of the organization. . . .

—Leonard D. White, *Further Contributions to the Prestige Value of Public Employment* (University of Chicago Press, 1932), pp. 87-88.

Management for Large Cities

By JOHN E. BEBOUT

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IN THE Autumn, 1954, number of *Public Administration Review* Professor Wallace S. Sayre announced that "a new managerial idea is taking hold in the large cities of the United States."¹ The idea, as Mr. Sayre explains it, is the double-barreled proposition that the administration of large cities "requires general managerial direction and that this requirement can best be met by establishing under the mayor a general manager who will, in greater or less degree, be the city government's second in administrative command."

The article concentrates on the second part of the proposition, namely, the idea that the best way to achieve over-all management in large cities is through the strong mayor-administrator plan rather than the council-manager plan. In the course of his argument the author makes certain observations about the history, theory, and practice of council-manager government that are virtually an invitation if not a command to further exploration and rejoinder.

I

WHILE Mr. Sayre's article purports to deal simply with the problem of management in "large cities," whatever they are, many of the author's reflections on the council-manager plan raise serious questions about the validity and permanence of the place it has already won in the American municipal scene. Consequently, the article amounts to an oblique attack on the foundations of a system that has been generally hailed both here and abroad as one of the most important American contributions to the science and art of government. It is, therefore, necessary to review the Sayre thesis in a somewhat broader context

than would be called for if it actually applied only to the few giant cities.

In developing the case for the "new managerial idea" Mr. Sayre asserts that it is built "upon the strong-mayor tradition as the most widespread form of city government in the United States." He puts great stress upon the office of the elected chief executive "as the center of political leadership and responsibility." An underlying idea running through the article is that the mayor-manager or mayor-administrator plan is more consistent with the history and tradition of the American political system than the council-manager plan with its reliance upon legislative supremacy. The plan, he asserts, "is in the mainstream of the administrative doctrine heralded by the President's Committee on Administrative Management in 1937, and reaffirmed by the Hoover Commission's later studies of the national government. The central idea of these studies, and dozens of their counterparts in the states, has been to strengthen the position of the elected chief executive in his political and administrative leadership."

This is an interesting interpretation of American political and administrative history as it relates to city government. It fits neatly the theory that government, like all Gaul, is or should be divided into three parts, executive, legislative, and judicial. It also accords with the popular notion that, despite the fact that local and state government came first, the pattern hammered out in the Constitutional Convention of 1787 should be the inspiration and guide for all our governments. Unfortunately, it strikes the present writer as about as historical as Parson Weems' story of the cherry tree.

There are no statistics that support the notion that the strong mayor plan is or ever has been "the most widespread form of city gov-

¹"The General Manager Idea for Large Cities," 14 *Public Administration Review* 253-58.

ernment in the United States." On the contrary, the tradition of American city government is one of government by commissions and committees. To be sure, there are more so-called mayor-council cities than there are commission or manager cities. According to the 1955 *Municipal Year Book*, 52 per cent of all cities over 5,000 have the mayor-council plan, whereas 14.1 per cent have the commission, 30.3 per cent have the council-manager plan, and 3.6 per cent operate with town meeting or representative town meeting.² However, a substantial majority of the mayor-council cities have what any textbook would rate as the weak mayor rather than the strong mayor plan. Since one of the common characteristics of weak mayor governments is supervision of departments by council committees, which often means the chairmen thereof, many so-called weak mayor governments are much closer in operation to the commission than to the strong mayor plan.

If we go back some years we discover that since 1917 the mayor-council plan has lost a good deal of ground percentage-wise, especially in larger cities. Of cities over 30,000, the percentage with the mayor-council plan (weak and strong) dropped from 59 in 1917 to 43 in 1952. During the same period the percentage of council-manager places rose from 5 to 36.³

Cincinnati, with council-manager government, is the only city over 500,000 that does not have some variation of the mayor-council plan. It is certainly not without significance, however, that the council-manager plan is the most popular in the next lower population group—250,000 to 500,000—⁴ as well as in the 50,000 to 100,000 and 25,000 to 50,000 populations groups. Except for the small group of very large cities, it is in the distinctly small-city class—5,000 to 10,000—that the mayor-council plan has a wide margin over all others. Of these 1,181 cities, 62.2 per cent have the mayor-council plan, 23.7 per cent the council-manager plan.

² *The Municipal Year Book, 1955* (International City Managers' Association, 1955), p. 57.

³ *Forms of Municipal Government* (National Municipal League, 1953), p. 2.

⁴ 39.1 per cent of the cities have the council-manager plan, 34.8 per cent the mayor-council plan, and 26.1 per cent the commission plan. *The Municipal Year Book, 1955*, p. 57.

To say the least, these trends cast doubt on the thesis that the strong mayor-administrator plan is better tuned to American tradition than the council-manager plan.

At the end of his article Mr. Sayre complains that a "distinctive . . . feature of the council-manager plan—the selection of the chief administrator by the city council—was not only something of an historical accident in the United States; it was also a striking anomaly in a country in which the most distinctive political institution is the elected chief executive as the keystone of political, governmental, and managerial progress. The mayor manager idea," he continues, "has the great and lasting value that it brings the reorganization of our city governments back into a familiar focus, consistent with our efforts in the national and state governments. In this respect it is an indigenous political idea."

Despite the fine dash of patriotic fervor in this peroration, perhaps one may be permitted to ask certain questions. How old does a political idea have to be in order to be "indigenous"? If the council-manager idea of the twentieth century was an historical accident, was not the elected Presidency of the late eighteenth century equally an historical accident—especially since the makers of the Constitution did their best to protect the Presidency from the evils presumed to be inherent in popular election of the chief magistrate? Or, having once made that accidental but unquestionably happy discovery, must we stigmatize all future and variant avenues toward "political, governmental, and managerial progress" at whatever level of government as nongenuine?

These questions begin to have more force when one reflects on the failure of most states to develop the office of governor in the image of that of President. The recent report of the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations points out that "today, few States have an adequate executive branch headed by a governor who can be held generally accountable for executing and administering the laws of the State."⁵ In other words, very few states have anything analogous to the strong mayor plan that Mr. Sayre finds so natural to the American scene. As already suggested, an examina-

⁵ *A Report to the President for Transmittal to the Congress* (Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 42.

tion of the charters of mayor-council cities would also show that there is only a relatively small number of cities that have as yet been prepared to entrust their elected chief executive with the powers necessary to justify holding him "generally accountable for executing and administering" the affairs of the city. The truth is that the strong mayor plan is largely a myth, or at best an objective.

Of course, it is true that state Little Hoover and economy and efficiency commissions going back almost half a century have been urging the strengthening of the office of governor. Some progress has been made in this direction. In like manner there has been a tendency in some mayor-council cities that have not gone over to the council-manager plan to add, bit by bit, new strength to the office of mayor. This is all to the good for the states and cities concerned, but one wonders why the generally more substantial and spectacular progress resulting from the adoption of the council-manager plan in approximately 1,300 communities should not be regarded as at least an equally characteristic American achievement.

Mr. Sayre is careful to avoid referring specifically to the American doctrine of the separation of powers as a justification for the strong mayor plan. Yet what he is saying in effect is that the separation of powers between independently elected legislative and executive branches, which is one of the prime characteristics of the United States government and a theoretical characteristic of all our state governments, should be embraced at the municipal level. This justification, naturally enough, has not escaped the attention of persons advocating adoption of strong mayor-administrator charters.

For example, the final report of the Newark Charter Commission, dated September 3, 1953, lists "a clear separation of powers between the council as the legislative body, and the mayor as the head of the city administration" as the first of "six basic principles deemed essential to efficient and responsive local government." The second principle is that the mayor "be the chief policy maker" and the third calls for "unified administration of all local services" under the mayor. The council is, however, supposed to "serve as an independent critic of the exercise" of the mayor's executive power

and checks and balances between the mayor and council are stressed. The commission's own words reveal the dilemma that is inherent in the separation of powers system. In the policy area, for example, the commission declares that the council "will legislate on matters of public policy," but "the mayor, who will be directly accountable to the people, . . . will be the chief policy maker." Although the record of the first year of Newark city government under its new strong mayor-administrator charter is generally a good one, the check and balance system has already produced some unfortunate conflicts between the mayor and council and the council has succeeded in preventing the mayor from appointing certain well qualified persons of his choice to important posts.

But the deadlocks, the buck-passing, and the evasions of responsibility that are common occurrences in governments organized on the basis of the separation of powers are too well known to need recounting here. Nor is this the occasion to argue the ultimate merits of the separation of powers principle for the higher levels of American government. It may be appropriate to observe, however, that the circumstances that led to incorporation of the separation of powers into the United States Constitution were of such a special character that they do not necessarily indicate it as a principle of universal or even of wide application. It probably was and still is the most practical solution of the complex problem of organizing government at the federal level. It may be the best solution for most states despite the fact that few of them have followed the national model closely enough to give it a good try.

A basic reason for resort to the separation of powers is to compensate through the elected chief executive for deficiencies in representativeness and leadership in the legislature. Such deficiencies are perhaps unavoidable both in the Congress and in many state legislatures. The bicameral system is an almost insuperable obstacle to responsible government based upon legislative supremacy. Fortunately all but eight American cities have found that they can get along very well with a one-house municipal legislature and the overwhelming majority of them have discovered that it is not

necessary to have a large and unwieldy body in order to achieve representativeness. The improvement in the quality and effectiveness in city councils has assuredly been a major element in the general improvement in the quality of city government which has occurred since James Bryce pronounced the government of cities to be the American people's "one conspicuous failure." While much of the improvement of city councils has been associated with the spread of the council-manager plan, it has also occurred in many mayor-council cities.

It seems hard to believe that if Mr. Sayre had taken full account of this phase of municipal history, he would have embraced the conclusion that the most promising if not the only road to municipal progress lies in maximizing the office of the elected mayor both as chief executive and as chief policy maker.

II

LET us now turn specifically to the problems involved in strengthening the governments of our largest cities. First, it is clear that the choice of means for improving management must depend heavily upon the kind of city council it is deemed desirable and possible to have. No one, for example, would suggest trying to make an appointed manager responsible to the present bicameral New York City Council. If the council-manager plan were ever to be considered seriously for the city of New York, it would have to be on the assumption that the present City Council would be replaced by a reasonably wieldy and representative one-house body. It would also be hopeless to try to base a council-manager operation on the present 50-member, completely ward-elected, Chicago City Council. It is almost equally impossible to imagine a sound council-manager government with the 35-member council, composed of 25 ward representatives and 10 aldermen elected at large, proposed by the recent report of the Chicago Home Rule Commission.⁶

Large cities are complex entities. If there is any representative pattern or formula that will work best in all cases it has not yet been discovered or generally agreed upon. The tailor-

ing of a city council to the needs and political realities in such a city is, therefore, one of the most difficult problems in representative government and one which calls for a certain amount of boldness and willingness to experiment. It is well worth the effort, however, because a sound city council is the surest first step toward good management, as it is toward wise policy making.

Mr. Sayre seems to suggest that there is something inherent in the nature of large cities that requires the leadership of an elected mayor who holds the principal prerogatives of a chief executive—"extensive powers to appoint, to remove, and to direct the heads of administrative agencies."

Of course policy leadership is necessary in large cities. It is also necessary or at least highly desirable in medium-sized and small cities. Fortunately, out of the richness of American municipal experience, we have learned that there is more than one way of providing for it. There are, for example, some pretty big council-manager cities that have not suffered for lack of policy leadership. In Cincinnati a number of vigorous personalities, beginning with Murray Seasongood, elected by their council colleagues to serve as mayor, have been more effective policy leaders than many a separately elected mayor enjoying substantial prerogatives of the traditional chief executive. Since the fall of Pendergast the same thing has been true of Kansas City where the mayor is elected separately from his colleagues on the council and has proved to be a political leader in the best sense of the word.

Before comparing the relative leadership potentialities in the strong-mayor and council-manager plans more closely, we should, perhaps, pause to consider just what we mean by leadership in city government. Much that passes for leadership in politics is strangely reminiscent of the sound and fury that accompanies a battle between two bulls. It is a matter of great importance to the contestants and may be to their more ardent partisans, but it has very little to do with the public interest.

Admittedly, this personalized counterfeit of public-oriented leadership may appear in connection with any form of government. But surely no sophisticated student of politics or administration now doubts that form has

⁶ *Modernizing a City Government* (University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 320.

something to do with selecting the people who choose or qualify to play the game, and even more to do with the rules by which the game is played. This unstated assumption, indeed, underlies Mr. Sayre's whole thesis.

Our common objective must be to find the formal or structural framework that will be most conducive to municipal progress. This means that we should seek a structure that will be as favorable as possible to the rise of elected leaders who are more concerned with municipal objectives than with their own future, more anxious to achieve substantive results than to wield power.

Experience indicates that, on the whole, the council-manager plan has certain positive advantages over the mayor-council plan as a vehicle for such constructive leadership. The basic reason for this is that the design of council-manager government is essentially functional. It is the simplest available structural arrangement for obtaining representative decisions on policy and competent execution of those decisions.

The structure of the strong-mayor, separation-of-powers plan, however, reflects the preoccupation of its designers with power and the struggle for power. In the endeavor to control the lust for power, it actually diverts attention from the public objectives to the private or personal perquisites and incidents of politics and limits participation by those who are unwilling or unable to compete on these terms. Even in the absence of strong personal or partisan rivalry, the normal interaction of the parts of the system tends to generate unnecessary friction and conflict. These tendencies adversely affect both short- and long-term policy planning and continuous, skilled administration.

The mayor in council-manager cities is usually chosen by his colleagues on the council because they deem him their most effective spokesman. If he is separately elected, he is likely to have been nominated to lead the winning slate of council candidates. In either case, there is no built-in invitation to bickering between the mayor and the majority of council. Moreover, the fact that the mayor has no personal appointments of consequence to make and no orders to issue to administrative personnel eliminates patronage as a po-

tential source of discord between him and his associates. And since the mayor is the leader only as long as he speaks for the majority, he can be replaced or by-passed by a new mayor or *de facto* leader if he gets hopelessly out of line. All of this helps to account for the fact that issues of policy, including the basic issue of maintaining or of raising the quality of administration, tend to loom larger in comparison with mere questions of personality in elections in council-manager cities than they do in others.

Another advantage of council-manager government is that it does not put all its leadership eggs in one basket. Neither the city charter nor the fact of popular election can be counted on to endow a legally strong mayor with the skill and wisdom to be the kind of leader in policy and administration that a city should have. But, if a "strong" mayor fails to provide proper leadership, there is generally no one who can fill the breach. Members of the council are in no position, legally or politically, to compensate for his deficiencies. They are on the other side of a wall and their natural bent is to throw bricks at the mayor and make political capital out of his weaknesses, not to bolster him. An ambitious councilman or a leader in a rival faction or party may be grooming to succeed the mayor, but until he has the office his efforts are likely to be disruptive rather than constructive in terms of their effect on both policy and administration. This tendency of the separation of powers system has been demonstrated repeatedly at all levels of government.

In a council-manager city, however, the mayor is simply the first among equals. He is presumed to be the chief policy spokesman of the majority in council, but leadership can be and often is shared by several council members in a manner that would be difficult or impossible in a mayor-council city. Deficiencies on the part of the mayor can thus be made up by, literally, putting leadership in commission.

In addition the council-manager plan has the manager, a leadership asset of no mean importance. There are no people more firm in their determination to keep managers out of politics in the ordinary sense of the word than the managers themselves. On the other

hand, the manager is recognized not only as the council's agent for executing policy but also as the council's servant in developing plans and proposals for its consideration. While responsibility for public advocacy of proposed policies is vested in the council and in the mayor as its chief spokesman, the manager is responsible for maintaining a continuous flow of public information of the kind that provides a basis for public understanding and evaluation of policy proposals. Thus the code of ethics adopted by the International City Managers' Association describes the manager "as a community leader" who "submits policy proposals to the council and provides the council . . . a basis for making decisions on community goals." Speaking of the same function of the manager, Leonard G. Howell, city manager of Des Moines, Iowa, and former president of the International City Managers' Association, listed as one of the obligations of the manager a duty to "assume his role as a responsible civic leader—not a political leader—and act accordingly." Elaborating on this point, Mr. Howell declared that "a manager must be more than a technical administrator . . . he must find out the needs and desires of the people of his community and recommend to council solutions to those problems, including the ways and the means to accomplish them—he should be able to carry to the people of his city by word of mouth an accurate and competent account of what his city is doing—never as a political proposition, but as one primarily interested in and responsible for the civic welfare of his community."⁷

Anyone who has taken the trouble to follow the voluminous professional literature that flows from experience with council-manager government knows that an increasing amount of attention is being devoted to this aspect of the manager's function as it relates to his dealings with the council, with municipal employees, and with the general public.⁸

⁷ *What Are the Elements of Continued Successful Operation for the Council-Manager Plan of Municipal Government?* published by the Colorado Municipal League as a contribution to the thinking and action of the citizens, elected officials, and administrators for the council-manager cities of Colorado, 1951.

⁸ See especially numerous articles in *Public Management*—for example, "Relations of the Manager with the Public," a report prepared for discussion at the 40th

It is now clear, if there was ever any doubt about it, that when a city hires a manager it should expect to hire not only a good generalist in municipal administration but also a sensitive civic and public relations consultant to the city council. Thus the manager is to the city government something like what an efficient executive secretary is to a large voluntary civic, welfare, or other community agency.

It was suggested earlier that leadership in council-manager government could be and often is shared by the mayor and other members of the city council. Actually, it is also shared between them and the manager. The mayor and council members handle the conventionally political aspects of the task and the manager plays a role in the area of public information, the visible dimensions of which will depend to a considerable extent on how much of the limelight the mayor and council want to reserve for themselves.

It is sometimes true, as managers themselves have complained, that mayors and councilmen are too ready to let the manager carry the ball. Whether or not this is a special weakness of the council-manager plan as some have suggested is open to question, for many a "strong mayor" has failed equally to give effective attention to the constructive aspects of political leadership. In any event, in a council-manager government inadequate leadership on the part of the people's elected representatives can at least to some degree be compensated for by an articulate and effective manager speaking with the knowledge and consent of the council which may fire him any time it feels he is not representing it properly. It is safe to say that many a city has been saved from civic or governmental stagnation because of the professional civic leadership that the manager has been able to bring to bear in the making and explanation of public policy.

This brings us to consideration of the "politics-administration dilemma which," according to Mr. Sayre, "increasingly bedevils the council-manager plan in operation" and also is a problem for the mayor-administrator plan. Mr. Sayre is able to comfort himself with the

Annual Conference of the International City Managers' Association held at St. Petersburg, Florida, December 5-8, 1954, in 37 *Public Management* 77-83.

thought that the mayor-administrator plan may have the advantage in the ultimate resolution of this dilemma by imagining that "council-manager doctrine emphasizes council monopoly over policy while practice underscores the necessity for policy leadership by the manager. . . ." The council-manager plan is today a going operation of some 40-odd years' standing. Many theories, appropriate and inappropriate, have been propounded in connection with it. The plan continues to gain ground, however, on the basis of practice, and the practice is essentially that described in the preceding paragraphs. This practice, more naturally and efficiently than that of any other plan, reflects that "unity of the governmental process," which the Temporary State Commission to Study the Organizational Structure of the Government of the City of New York accepted as fundamental to a sound system of government.⁹ In developing its concept of this essential unity the commission asserted that "politics and administration are not airtight departments separated from each other by clearly identifiable walls. They are merely phases in the continuous process of government, which, in itself, is a phase in the process of social organization." Splendid! No better justification for the council-manager plan in practice has ever been written. The commission was able to fall into the trap of using this as an argument for preferring the strong mayor plan to the council-manager plan because it saw the council-manager plan through the haze of the curious notion about council-manager doctrine or theory that Mr. Sayre later expounded in his article.

III

THE foregoing observations on the practice as distinct from more or less gratuitous theories of council-manager and mayor-council governments do not, of course, tell us what form of government most of the country's dozen or so giant cities will or should have in the future. The purpose of this article has

been primarily to try to keep the record straight and see to it that the claims of America's distinctive contribution to municipal government, government based upon the marriage of legislative supremacy with professional competence, shall not be sold down the river.

The present writer is inclined to believe that most of these largest cities will continue to operate with some variation of the mayor-council form. In some cases the great unlikelihood of reorganizing the city council so that it would provide a safe basis for administration by a manager solely responsible to it is reason enough for this prediction, though it may be hoped that political ingenuity will not cease to work with the problem of giving our largest cities, as well as our states, more effective and more representative legislatures. In other cases, tradition and entrenched political interests would make a break to the council-manager plan pretty difficult to achieve.

Mr. Sayre points out that in some large cities the office of mayor is very "important as a prize in the party battle, its possession one of the significant keys to state and even national party power." He adds that "it would seem unlikely that any large city would abandon such a governmental and political asset." Maybe so, but it should not be imagined that mayors and council members in council-manager cities, whether elected on party or on nonpartisan ballots, have no influence in behalf of their cities in Washington or the state capitol. The recent past president of the American Municipal Association, for example, was Mayor William E. Kemp of Kansas City who, though elected mayor on a nonpartisan ballot, has been a highly effective leader in the dominant national party in his city and state.

Assuredly there will continue to be mayor-council cities. Let us hope that more and more of them will give their mayors the prerogatives necessary to be effective chief executives and policy leaders. This writer shares with Mr. Sayre the hope that those cities will learn how to make the maximum use of professional managerial talent. Mr. Sayre believes he sees a trend toward appointment by the mayor of a single general administrator to be his second in command with respect to the entire city

⁹ *Four Steps to Better Government of New York City: A Plan for Action*. Report of the Temporary State Commission to Study the Organizational Structure of the Government of the City of New York, 1953, p. 33. Devereux C. Josephs was chairman of the commission and Wallace S. Sayre was director of research.

administration. Actually, the number of cases that it is yet possible to analyze is so inconclusive on this point that it is far from certain that the single top administrator is necessarily better for every large city than some variation on the Philadelphia plan of providing the mayor with several high-level administrative aides.¹⁰ The problem of providing the mayor with an adequate professional staff is not altogether different from that of staffing the office of governor or of President, or even that of manager. What is needed is continuing experimentation and objective analysis of experience with various methods of staffing the chief executives in our larger governments. Mr. Sayre disclaims any wish to develop a new cult interested in promoting the mayor-manager or mayor-administrator plan. Premature identification of a "trend" in that direction might conceivably tend to discourage further progress by making it appear that "the way" had already been found.

¹⁰ Charlton F. Chute, *Modern Ideas on Administrative Assistants for the Mayor in Large American Cities*, (privately published, May 17, 1954).

There are, of course, many matters in connection with the government of our cities that cry out for further research, as Mr. Sayre himself has suggested. Some of these have to do primarily with the best ways to organize professional assistance for elected political and citizen officials. Some of them have to do with the relation between form and structure, on the one hand, and political organization and leadership, on the other. Some of them have to do with the ways and means by which citizens may best organize and conduct themselves through voluntary political and civic organizations to get and maintain good government. Some of them have to do with the relations between local and state and national politics.

There is special need for increased attention to research on many problems of political and civic leadership, organization, and action. In the long run no government will remain permanently far above the level of the capacity of a fairly good cross section of the citizens to work together through political and civic agencies for sound, common objectives.

The Contributions of the Great City

The metropolitan city has played a great part in the history of mankind. It can continue to play a great part in the future, if we guide its destiny wisely and well. I have referred . . . to some of the severe criticisms which have recently been levelled at the metropolis. But there is much to love and to admire in the great city. It is the home of the highest achievements of man in art, literature and science; the source from which the forces of freedom and emancipation have sprung. It is the place where the spirit of humanism and of democracy have grown and flourished, where man's quest for knowledge and justice has been pursued most constantly, and truth revealed most faithfully and fearlessly.

—William A. Robson, "The Great City of Today" in William A. Robson (ed.), *Great Cities of the World; Their Government, Politics and Planning* (The Macmillan Co., 1955), p. 105.

The Public Advisory Board as an Instrument of Government

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FEW institutions of government have multiplied so rapidly in the past twenty-five years as the public advisory committee. Its closest kin, the industry advisory committee, proliferates in times of emergency but dwindles toward the vanishing point once the war is over or the crisis past. With the public advisory board, there are no such ups and downs. The record since 1938, when there were fewer than 100 in the entire federal government, is one of steady increase. Today the Department of Agriculture alone has half a hundred at the national level, as compared with four in 1938, and the number for the federal service as a whole has risen to several hundred.

This new-found popularity of the public advisory board shows little sign of decreasing. Boards are being used even more widely in the Eisenhower administration than they were under President Truman. Yet no comprehensive study of the device has been made since the National Resources Planning Board completed its researches on it in 1938, and little real attention has been given it by students of government.

Public advisory boards vary widely in form, size, and operating characteristics, leading one observer to comment that "no two advisory committees are alike in their purpose, organization or effectiveness."¹ There is no question that to a very large degree they are creatures of circumstance, differing according to the nature of the problems they are called upon to

face, the kind of leadership they get, and the pressures put upon them.

Characteristics of Advisory Boards

LIKE the industry advisory committees that they in many ways resemble, public advisory boards exist, officially, to give government agencies the benefit of advice from people outside agency ranks—outside the government altogether, in most cases. In the scope of this advice, however, the two types of committee differ markedly. Industry advisory committees deal with problems, often of a technical nature, affecting specific industries or activities. Public advisory boards, on the other hand, are concerned with broad, general areas of policy or with matters of over-all national interest.

This difference between the two types of board is the source of other differences, notably the kind of people who make up their membership. The industry board member is likely to be a man with business or professional interests in the area of board concern, i.e., a meat packer on the Processed Meat Advisory Committee. One observer suggests that the whole *raison d'être* of the industry board is "to enlist the support of the regulated in the process of regulation."² It is a matter of record that some industry board members have been so close to the problems on which they are asked to give advice that the Department of Justice has taken a great deal of interest in their activities. Public advisory board members, on the other hand, are far more likely to be drawn from varied professions and backgrounds and gen-

¹ U.S. National Resources Planning Board, Science Committee, "Study of Advisory Committees in the Federal Government," prepared by Norman N. Gill. Washington, mimeographed, 1939. pp. 2-3.

² Lincoln Gordon, "Government Controls in Peace and War," 20 *Bulletin of the Business Historical Society* 50 (April, 1946).

erally have no immediate personal stake in the specific issues under consideration.

Most advisory boards in the federal government are created under the "general purpose clauses" of the agencies, although a few owe their existence to a specific statute. There are also a small number with *de facto* existence which, for official purposes, are merely a meeting of "advisers to the Secretary"—where the agency's lawyers feel that insufficient authority exists to empanel them. The general purpose clause of the agency, permitting the Secretary or administrator to appoint such advisers as necessary (sometimes committees are indicated specifically) or to take necessary administrative steps to obtain information and advice, is the usual legal foundation on which the institution rests.

There is no real pattern as to size. Advisory boards of three members have been encountered and also one, a veritable assembly, of ninety-one. The majority probably fall between three and fifteen, the members serving in most instances without compensation and in a large number of cases without reimbursement for travel and out-of-pocket expenses. Congress is likely to be more generous in this respect than the agencies, most boards created by statute carrying a per diem, usually \$50. Although a few boards meet monthly, the majority probably hold not more than four meetings a year.

While members of most boards serve at the convenience of the administrator, there are certain practical difficulties in abolishing a board once constituted, or, for that matter, in replacing individual members—even when the administration of the agency has changed. One board secretary reported that the members of his board resented being asked to yield their places to others. In this dilemma, the administrator, who wanted new blood, decided that he would drop old members and appoint new ones on the basis of lot. The three-year term, with a third of the board being replaced each year, is, however, a popular one.

There is no standard practice in the method by which board chairmen are selected. In the majority of cases they are from outside the agency. Most appear to be appointed by the administrator, but some are selected by the members. In a few instances—surprisingly few in

view of the advantages of this method—the administrator or some official designated by him is chairman. Many boards have a full-time executive secretary, but most of them depend upon someone in the agency to do their secretarial work as a collateral service. An outside chairman may even use a private staff.

The Uses of Advisory Boards

BEHIND the formal purpose of the public advisory board—to give advice—lie potentialities far more complex and, frequently, far more significant. Besides fulfilling their nominal functions, boards can serve as the means to a dozen diverse ends. In some respects, they are all things to all men. To senators and congressmen they may be devices for channeling interest group pressures into bureaucrats' offices and away from Capitol Hill. To critics of a program, the public advisory board attached to it may appear as an important device for curbing strong administrators.

The administrator may regard the board as a laboratory for testing new ideas, a proving ground for trial balloons. He may also see it as a means of support, a way of "selling" his program to the country. It can be a device to use against those who oppose him; an arena for pitting groups and interests against each other; and a recruiting office for supporters as well. Or, privately, he may value the board because it gives him an opportunity to associate with leaders in fields where he may later need connections.

The members of his staff may see the board as an opportunity for obtaining internal support for their own projects. The secretary may see it as a potential source of influence or power. Or, it may be relished because, for a few moments, at least, it gives those in the lower echelons an opportunity to brush elbows with the great.

The men and women who sit on public boards enjoy the opportunity to discuss important problems within the framework of government and to register their points of view before the fact. If they represent an organized interest, they accept this service as an ingredient of power, however circumscribed, welcoming the chance to assess the ebb and flow of political forces.

A Source of Advice. To recognize that an ad-

visory board may have more to contribute than advice is not to deny that advising is, or may be, a real function of such a body. How well a given board serves in this capacity will, of course, depend on such factors as the nature of the problems facing the agency, the current public views of the program, the attitude of the administrator, and the makeup of the board itself. The important thing is for all concerned to be clear about the *kind* of advice a board may fruitfully give. Public advisory boards cannot and should not initiate policy, nor should they be permitted to assume any kind of program responsibility. There are times when members can give useful technical advice; but by and large the board's greatest contribution is by way of reassurance that the established policy is sound, that it will be understood, and perhaps supported. As one government official observed, "When members of our board agreed with us, it convinced us more than ever that we were on the right track, and made it harder to dissuade us from it."

A Source of Support. The possibility of using a board as a means of obtaining support for a program has been regarded by more than one administrator as the natural—and expected—function of the board. This is usually a chimera. Boards can be used in this fashion, and have been on more than one occasion, but such action is ordinarily taken at the suggestion of the board itself and not of the administrator.

The willingness of the members to give their support to a program will vary. Some will refuse as a matter of principle to give assistance of any kind, while others will go to surprising lengths to be helpful. The situation is always a delicate one and the administrator who is seeking support should proceed with the greatest caution. Any suggestion that the board is being maneuvered into a position of tractability will be deeply resented. Many administrators fail to recognize this elementary fact.

Nevertheless, boards will often be responsive to the willingness of an administrator to accept their advice over a considerable period of time and to incorporate it into the program. One administrator noted for his sensitivity and tact had only to mention the failure of members of Congress to "understand the program" to have the members of his board springing into action. Another board even volunteered

to underwrite the agency's findings in a controversial field in which it felt that public support was needed. This, however, came only after several years of agency-board relationships in which mutual confidence was developed.

Support, where it occurs, may actually be expressed in a variety of ways. The following are examples: (a) favorable public statements or resolutions by members; (b) the willingness of members to place themselves at the disposition of the public relations division of the agency; (c) endorsement by interest groups or organizations with which the members may be associated; (d) encouragement of the program among members of Congress and other influential persons; and (e) actual partisan political activity.

The Interpretive Role. An advisory board can interpret as well as justify an agency program to the public. An English writer noted this function in calling the board device "an invaluable instrument for breaking administrative measures on the back of the public."³ Many members who would shrink from a general public endorsement of the program are willing to spend considerable time and effort in explaining it to various publics. As the member becomes more and more familiar with the program and problems of the agency, his interest increases and a sense of personal identification with the agency is likely to grow.

Interpretation often leads to direct support; but even when it does not, it opens many doors. For example, the agency may be able to state its case through the facilities of private organizations. This is a major consideration at a time when severe limitations are being placed on government informational programs. Like support, the interpretive role is never a foregone conclusion; it is achieved only when the members feel a kind of partnership with the program. This, in turn, is likely to reflect preparation on the part of the agency.

A "Listening Post." A board whose membership represents many types of interests from different parts of the country can provide an effective "listening post" for sampling and weighing points of view that otherwise might

³ Sir Arthur Salter, as quoted by Harold Laski, *A Grammar of Politics* (Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1935), p. 376.

not be known until too late, if at all. Often the board member will be able to express the interest view because he has helped to formulate it. The astute administrator will recognize this fact and take advantage of it. An experienced and trusted membership, moreover, will know how to handle the administrator's "trial balloons," informing him of the implications of many of his proposals before they reach the public.

A Means of Reaching Agreement. The advisory board can sometimes serve as a forum for resolving conflicts that otherwise might injure the program. The board room should not become an arena for propaganda battles, but simply bringing together diverse persons and interests will sometimes lead to agreement—or at least to greater understanding in the face of differences. Such an achievement was ascribed to President Truman's National Advisory Board on Mobilization Policy. James Carey, the secretary-treasurer of the CIO and a veteran of many boards, said that he valued board service because it gave him an opportunity to hear and evaluate the other fellow's arguments—whether from another organization or from the government. Others serving on public boards have agreed that this service offered an opportunity to hear in private views they might not otherwise have encountered.⁴

An Agency for Special Studies. The permanent public advisory board can sometimes be used for conducting special studies or investigations. The advantages of such a procedure are obvious. The members of the board are already on duty; they do not need to be recruited or cleared for security. Moreover, they are likely to be familiar with one another's ideas and working habits—an important time-saver—and to have some basic familiarity with the problem to be studied. The problem they are asked to study, however, must be one in which their agency relationships have not compromised their integrity. The International Development Advisory Board (to the Point 4 Program) studied the problem of the underdeveloped areas, producing a landmark report,

Partners in Progress. The Public Advisory Board for Mutual Security, at President Truman's request, studied United States trade and tariff policy (the Bell study), coming up with the "national interest" theory as a measure of tariff acceptability.⁵ In neither instance did their association with these programs appear to react unfavorably on their recommendations.

A Device for Patronage. An astute politician once remarked that if he were President he would value advisory boards as a chance to pay off political debts. He conceded that his own appointment to one such board might fit this category. This does not necessarily reflect unfavorably on any aspect of the board's usefulness, but simply points up the fact that a new administration frequently has more supporters than it can conveniently place. Appointment of some of them to advisory boards satisfies the need for political unity without sacrificing leadership.

Activities Related to Administration. The advisory board is not an agency for administrative action. Nevertheless there are times when a board may legitimately be used in an area that ordinarily is regarded as exclusively the province of the administrator. Members of the Public Advisory Board for Mutual Security, for example, were occasionally used as special representatives of various administrators on missions or assignments not only to Europe but in this country as well. Labor members were able to give private assurances to European labor leaders concerning the objectives of the Marshall Plan at a time when the Communists, through their strength in the European unions, were attempting to undermine it.

Board members can also be used as a means of strengthening the administrator internally by supporting certain projects or proposals. Their visits to the field are often important as a morale factor. In a number of instances, also, boards have been used as means of giving the administrator a glimpse of agency problems that had been closed off to him by intermediate officials.

⁴ A number of comments reported in this paper, like this one, were made directly to the author. Others were quoted to him by executive secretaries. For obvious reasons, it has not been possible to cite names in all instances.

⁵ International Development Advisory Board, Technical Cooperation Administration, *Partners in Progress* (Government Printing Office, 1951), 120 pp. Public Advisory Board for Mutual Security, *A Trade and Tariff Policy in the National Interest: A Report to the President* (Government Printing Office, 1953), 75 pp.

The Dangers of Advisory Boards

A RECITAL of the uses and values of public advisory boards should not lull the administrator into thinking it impossible for a board to turn and rend him. Generally, it is true, board members are anxious to avoid open quarrels with the agency, but it is equally true that there are real dangers in the use of advisory boards, and it is up to the administrator to be on guard against them.⁶

The hazard administrators most readily foresee is the meddling of the board in management. This can happen if a board misunderstands its proper function and comes to think of itself as a board of directors. Such a situation is as often the fault of the administrator as of the board. Either he has called upon his board to make operating decisions, and thus opened the way for their intransigence, or he has antagonized them by too tight control or by open disregard. There have been few instances where a board has tried to assume the functions of management, but there have been many where administrators believed that it wanted to do so.

A greater problem for the administrator is that effective board management demands too much of his time. This is one which cannot necessarily be laid at his own doorstep. Most administrators inherit their boards from previous agency heads or are given them by higher officers or by Congress. In the first instance a pattern has already been established to which the administrator must conform or run the risk of encouraging hostility both to himself and to the program.

There is also the danger that a board will be too strong a brake on progressive administration. Whether friendly or critical, a board is always a restraining factor which must be considered before action is taken. In the politically charged climate of Washington, administrators tend to be extremely sensitive to criticism of any kind, a condition which often leads to administrative timidity. This does not necessarily

mean they are shying at shadows. The news media of the capital are prepared to regard any sign of advisory board disagreement with a program as an "intra-administration wrangle."

The administrator invites another risk in working with advisory boards. Besides protecting his program and himself, he must be prepared to defend the interests of the public as a whole against boards too heavily weighted with special interest points of view. Professor Laski believed that there was a place on advisory boards for both special interest representatives and spokesmen for the general public, but he was willing to give special interests the larger representation.⁷ It is probably true, as he believed, that the special interest points of view are kept from excesses by differences among themselves. Still, the administrator cannot overlook the possibility of the general good being lost in the scuffle.

In fairness, however, it should be said that many of the problems, and some of the dangers, in the use of public advisory boards spring from the central problem of defining their role. Oftener than not, it is a feeling of futility which seems to involve them in areas or activities for which they are neither qualified nor competent. Instead of listening to endless recitals of agency achievement, they want to do something meaningful. Their errors are more frequently due more to problems of judgment than to bad intent.

It is, however, more usual for them to be driven in the direction of apathy. After a brave start many a board simply lapses into a sort of "permanent chrysalis." There may be a show of advice being asked but it is really only a show. The members are not fooled. They know that an open break with the agency is a break with the administration and usually they will go out of their way to avoid it. Finding their board service unsatisfactory, they merely lose interest and stop attending meetings. This is why Washington is littered with the bones of so many inactive advisory boards; and why so many students of administration hold them in little favor.

Strengthening the Role of the Board

DESPITE the weaknesses—and even the dangers—of public advisory boards, there is no

⁶ President George Meany of the American Federation of Labor, for one, issued a blast at FOA Administrator Harold E. Stassen in resigning from Stassen's top advisory board. The story made Page 1 of *The New York Times* of Dec. 11, 1955. Later their differences were ironed out and Meany became a member of his Labor Advisory Board.

⁷ Laski, *op. cit.*, pp. 378-79.

question that they have become an important element of the capital scene. Under such circumstances, it is important to explore ways and means by which they can be made a more useful adjunct of administration.

There is no question that one of the most troubled areas has been that of defining board-agency relationships. Many board members complain that no one really wants their advice; they are assembled to hear lectures and occasionally to make ceremonial responses, little more. One veteran of many boards said bluntly: "Too many administrators today don't want advice—whether it comes from Congress, from a higher administrator, from people within the agency, or from his advisory board."

The administrator, for his part, is likely to reply that board members with their diverse backgrounds and lack of specific knowledge of the program are really not equipped to give useful advice. One former Secretary of State went so far as to accuse an advisory board (not to the members, however) of really wanting an office in the White House and a telephone to the President. Another referred to members of a board as "busybodies." So long as the board feels that the agency does not appreciate its potentialities—or even its good intentions—and the agency, on its side, feels that the board does not understand its limitations, the impasse is hopeless. It need not be, however.

What the Administrator Can Do. The first place to look for possibilities of improvement is in the administrator's office. The administrator is the key figure in the situation, the source of leadership and the wellspring of morale. He must, as Avery Leiserson says of him, have "the ability, the personality, and the imagination to attract men of vision among influential groups, to impart a sense of urgency in solving his problems, and to give them (the members) a sense of pride in being associated with his work."⁸ Successful use of a board calls for what one Budget Bureau official has described as "the ability to manage the board without appearing to do so."

An administrator's desire to work with a board, however, should not be mistaken for ability to do so. Mr. Leiserson also cautions

that patience, energy, and understanding are required. The administrator must have a certain flair for "group leadership" and must also be willing to accept help from others who recognize problems and think they can solve them. This last is very important. No amount of charm and salesmanship can make up for the absence of a genuine willingness to listen to the board's contributions. Nor will approval of a man as a program administrator blind board members to his shortcomings as a chairman.

When W. Averell Harriman became director for mutual security in 1951, he took over a public advisory board that had lost all expectation of being useful to the program. Within three months, board attendance, once so poor that it was hard to obtain a quorum, had nearly doubled. The board's mood changed so drastically that its members even agreed to undertake a study of the delicate subject of tariffs for an outgoing President four months before the 1952 election! Harriman's secret was simple. He wanted to work with his board; he sought out its members for consultation; and he found activities that were appropriate for them to undertake.

There are some who believe that boards to be most useful should be chaired by persons outside the parent agency. They argue that the board cannot do its job of providing outside advice unless its chairman is free of interest in the program, with more time to give to the board than the administrator could possibly have. Such an argument, however, overlooks the fact that a board can easily become a separate force in the agency. If it is to give meaningful advice, it has the right to demand information and a staff to obtain and assimilate it. It also has the right—because it is in effect *outside* the agency—to inform the public of its findings. Instead of being purely advisory, it now courts authority; it has captured an aspect of public opinion, making it a force in determining the shape of the program. This was the experience of the Advisory Board of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion which reached such an impasse that its secretary found he must serve either the board or the agency. It is interesting that he chose the former.⁹

⁸ Avery Leiserson, *Administrative Regulation: A Study of Representation of Interests* (University of Chicago Press, 1942), pp. 167-68.

⁹ Herman M. Somers, *Presidential Agency: The Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion* (Harvard University Press, 1950), pp. 101-08.

This does not mean that a split is certain; there is no question, however, that the possibility of one is increased greatly by use of the outside chairman. Moreover, if the greatest benefit to be derived from an advisory board comes from the administrator's own desire to be advised, it will be apparent that little has been gained in this direction by forcing advice upon him.

The Choice of Members. Technical knowledge and familiarity with the program are useful attributes for advisory board members to have, but the really essential requirements are that members approve in general the objectives of the program and that they be reasonable men.

Neither of these provisos is meant to imply that mere "yes-men" are wanted. Administrators have often found that the most useful contributions have come from former critics. Naturally, outright enemies should be avoided, but a certain amount of skepticism does no harm. A mildly critical board member may help the administrator understand hostile areas of public opinion. Conversely, he may have his own understanding broadened by closer contact with the program. To be fully useful, the board should have more on it than fully-committed supporters of the program.

The ideal "board type" is someone whose convictions have not made him dogmatic, who understands bureaucratic practices, who appreciates board-agency relationships, and who is more interested in the national welfare than in promoting a factional cause. This is no allegorical man. There are more such men, as many executive secretaries will testify, than one at first supposes.

Recent years have seen federal boards tend more and more to become what Jonathan Daniels once called a "sort of Sanhedrin of the big pressure groups".¹⁰ Labor insists on naming its own representatives ("we cannot have outsiders telling us who represents labor"), and there is a tendency to pass around board assignments to the Washington representatives of various groups, ignoring the advantages to be

gained by occasionally looking farther afield. Freshness and vigor come into the board room with new people, and it should never be forgotten that what they learn in the course of their service will flow back into the nation as increased public understanding of government.

The Size of the Board. There is no one ideal size for a public advisory board. It is, of course, easier to work with a small than a large group, but size will vary with the other factors in a given situation. John Graves, analyzing English advisory committees, has set down some observations which apply equally well to American committees:

An educational committee of 32 can conveniently meet, it seems, about three times a year, one of 16 about six times, while one of eight can probably manage a monthly meeting. When the committee is small and meets often, its members soon strike up a friendly relationship and in this atmosphere are encouraged to speak frankly. This leads them to tackle problems in a bold, constructive way and to make positive and practical recommendations. Above all, each member of a small committee feels that he or she has a special contribution to make. As a result, they attend regularly and maintain a lively interest in the committee's work.¹¹

There are many times when the nature of the representation the administrator may desire requires that one faction to be represented if another is, with the result that even a board of medium size is populated in a hurry.¹² Boards of from ten to fifteen, however, can be managed satisfactorily. Graves's comment on the "special contribution" of the members is one of the key points in his analysis. If the board is interested in what it is doing, and if the members know their work is significant, the size of the board and the frequency of meetings will matter less.

Defining the Board's Purpose. Important people will usually find time for advisory board activities if their value can be demonstrated. This is not to say that a board's function must be completely spelled out from the beginning. Many a successful board develops its function over a period of time. The important thing is

¹⁰ Although this comment was made in a letter to the author (January 11, 1954) the idea is developed at greater length by Mr. Daniels in his *Frontier on the Potomac* (The Macmillan Company, 1946) in a chapter entitled "Are We Being Followed?"

¹¹ R. V. Vernon and N. Mansergh, eds., *Advisory Bodies: A Study of Their Uses in Relation to Central Government, 1919-1939* (Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1940), p. 218.

¹² No matter how onerous or inconsequential a service the committee may be called upon to perform, there is usually competition for its membership.

for members to have a sense of participation in the program.

The administrator is basically responsible for setting the tone of advisory board work. Inspiration, if it is to come at all, emanates from him. But other members of the agency and the board's professional staff have major supporting work to do.

Obtaining the Board's Advice. If the board's advice is to be sought as a unit, considerable thought should be given not only to the problem on which advice is sought but also to the manner in which the question is phrased. This is why good agenda-making is coming more and more to be thought of as one of administration's most useful arts.

The statement of any question should, of course, be accompanied by documentation—background information that is necessary to an intelligent understanding of the problem. This will cite existing policy, the major considerations involved, and pertinent factual data. It is usually desirable for agency officials to outline the problem orally.

A strong word of caution should be inserted at this point. There is a tendency on the part of agency officials to overdo in this direction, and board meetings frequently degenerate into briefing sessions which are usually far from brief. (The national president of one important interest group remarked after sitting through many such sessions: "By now we must be the best educated bunch of private citizens in the United States.") There is little that is less useful to the agency. The members resent being lectured to and will often show this resentment by personal comments, by general criticism of the program, or by failure to attend meetings. Likewise, agency representatives should be cautioned against being overcritical of members' suggestions, and should watch also the tendency to defend their own views at all costs.

There is a great deal to be said, of course, for consulting board members on an individual basis. Since such meetings are undertaken on the initiative of the administrator and occur in the relative privacy of his office, they are often more likely to produce useful advice than the open board meeting.

Accepting the Board's Advice. The fact that a board gives him advice does not require the

administrator to accept all or even a major part of it. But he must be prepared to accept a certain amount of advice over a period of time.

The administrator enjoys a strategic position in this respect. He may indicate personal agreement with board proposals, rejecting them only because of conflict with higher authority, or because they are ahead of the times. He may want them considered by his own planners or he may use them to help mold opinion. It is a comforting thought for the administrator that boards seldom come up with ideas radically new or different from those being developed in the agency.

Whether it is done informally or through written reports, it is particularly important to let board members know when and how their advice has affected the operations of the agency. This can be done in a variety of ways. Field inspection trips, visits of important officials with board members, letters to members, and comments by the administrator all play an important role in convincing the board member that he has been useful to the program.

The Use of Staff. Effective board-agency relationships depend upon the willingness and the ability of the administrator and his staff to spend the necessary time and energy in developing them. There is no substitute for time, but there are ways by which the administrator's own contribution of time may be lessened. One of these is to make greater use of a board secretary.

The secretary is the eyes and the ears and, frequently, the voice of the administrator in his relationship with the board. He must have the confidence of the administrator and he must be able to win the confidence of the board. The administrator must keep in mind the fact that in serving more than one master, the secretary has opportunities for playing one against the other.

The secretary's work may be divided roughly into two categories—professional and service. He should keep the members currently informed of developments within the agency, brief them at regular intervals, do the basic intelligence work in preparation for the board discussions, and, in a number of instances, prepare papers for the members. He should keep the administrator informed of board views, and attempt to work out differences between

them if possible. He will be responsible for the initial development of the agenda for the meetings and for the follow-up to make sure that the administrator's decisions are carried out.

There are a great many services the secretary can perform to enhance the prestige of the board and many more he will be asked to perform as he and the members understand each other better. It is his responsibility to set the stage for board meetings. This can be enhanced by the use of a growing array of board-room paraphernalia, including agenda books, a system of documentation, charts, and other visual aids. Many of these things have been accepted for many years in private business but are still new to government.

An energetic secretary will be familiar with everything the board members do that has any bearing on the program, including meetings of organizations they represent, speeches they make, articles they write, and the like. Letters from the administrator to the members concerning these activities are an indication of the administrator's interest in the board; the secretary should initiate them. He should also prepare the reports of board meetings, in which the comments of the members should be suitably reflected.

There is growing recognition of the importance of the professional secretary in Washington and his prestige and usefulness are both on the rise. Grades will vary, but there are a number of advisory board secretaries now at GS-15 (\$11,610-\$12,690) or above.

Most professional secretaries appear to have at least two characteristics in common: an effectiveness in personal relationships and an ability to write. Both are of major importance. Sometimes the secretary is experienced in the work of the agency (such as engineering or economics), but his background may also be in political science or public administration.

The Future of the Advisory Board

AN EXPLANATION of the popularity of the public advisory board can, in all probability, be found in its basic adaptability to the bigness of bureaucracy. The board offers a means whereby the citizen and his government may be brought closer together. The principle that the citizen has a right to question public officials, and also to advise them, is a well established

part of democratic government. But as governments have become larger and more complex, the difficulties of putting this principle into practice have increased. The advisory board may well be the twentieth century way of coping with the problem.

Certainly the advisory board is a device by which more and more Americans can come to see their government in operation, to understand the problems public officials face, and, in a limited way, to have a part in their solution. William C. Foster, former Deputy Secretary of Defense, said that he regarded his advisory committees as an excellent recruiting area for federal administrative talent. Mr. Foster's point was that the training these men received in the folkways of government saved six months to a year of on-the-job experience.

Certain also is the fact that the existence of an advisory board gives some assurance to the public that the government is in safe hands. When the Marshall Plan was being considered by Congress in 1948, four of the five "official" proposals for the administration of this program contained a provision for a public advisory board and the fifth suggested that the administrator would probably want to establish several of them. Eight of the thirty-six persons who testified in hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations asked that a citizen advisory board be created and Walter Reuther, president of the United Automobile, Aircraft, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (CIO), confined his comments on administration almost entirely to a plea for such a board.¹³ These are significant facts.

Whenever and wherever the federal government undertakes projects that are sweeping in nature, complex, unfamiliar, and expensive, large numbers of people seem to feel the need of an advisory group to represent—and perhaps to safeguard—the public interest. The psychology of the matter suggests the straw chain that is fastened by a mahout around an elephant's leg. It may not be enough to hold him, but it seems to assure both the elephant and the public that each is protected against the other.

¹³ *European Recovery Program; Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eightieth Congress, Second Session, on United States Assistance to European Economic Recovery* (Government Printing Office, 1948), Parts I, II, III.

Executive Bill Clearance Procedure in Michigan

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MICHIGAN GOVERNORS, called upon to approve or veto a substantial part of the total legislative product in a short period of time at the end of legislative sessions, have been continually troubled by lack of adequate information from departments affected on the merits and potential costs of these last-minute enactments. After enrollment and transmission to the Governor, he has only ten days in which to approve or veto. Too frequently concrete information has been wanting, and frantic, last-minute telephone calls by the Executive Office to state agencies presumably affected have left all concerned frustrated and unhappy. Nor has the problem been restricted to the end-of-the-session jam. Even earlier in legislative sessions Governors have not infrequently been embarrassed by lack of information when suddenly confronted with the need to make a decision on a bill.

Not all bills, of course, come to the Governor's attention so anonymously. Major policy measures, particularly those which have been central to his legislative program, are usually well briefed. Modifications of language during their legislative course have been closely followed and the influence of the Governor has often shadowed them from the beginning.

But only a small portion of the total legislative grist receives this kind of intensive gubernatorial surveillance. The great mass of bills must receive their day-to-day surveillance from the individual departments concerned,

or from private interests. Because these bills of medium importance do not have high priority as part of the Governor's legislative program they tend to be ignored until the acute stage is reached of whether to approve or veto. Since hundreds of bills never reach the point of enrollment, any effort by the Governor to influence their day-to-day progress would only serve to divert limited manpower and energy from main-line legislative objectives.

What seems to be needed by a Governor is a warning system which will alert him to dangerous potentialities in these bills while they are progressing through the legislative mill. Thus, if the danger is great enough, the Executive Office can move in and try to block or modify them, whichever seems appropriate. In the event a bill passes, the Governor also needs information in the files which systematically analyzes the measure and thus furnishes a basis for his decision to approve or disapprove. Because Michigan legislative committees do not themselves show great interest in soliciting the departmental point of view before acting on a bill (a marked contrast to the situation in Congress), a high premium is placed on gubernatorial investigation of the departmental attitude.

We shall now describe legislative clearance procedures which were adopted by Michigan's Governor G. Mennen Williams to alleviate some of the gubernatorial difficulties. The discussion is limited to formal written

reporting procedures. Space does not permit full consideration of other important aspects of gubernatorial legislative leadership—for example: the several lengthy meetings with assembled department heads to hammer out the major items of the Governor's legislative program, or the many meetings with executive staff and subject-matter-area specialists on the content and form of the Governor's messages at the opening of the legislative session and on the budget and occasionally also on special subjects, or the weekly meetings with party leaders, or the many conferences with individual department heads on particular bills which concern them deeply but which, because of only medium importance from the Governor's point of view, do not receive high-priority interest from his office. Recent Michigan experience indicates that improvement of the formal mechanics for securing the departmental point of view on pending bills has greatly facilitated the Governor's effectiveness in the legislative process.

On January 12, 1954, a communication from Governor Williams to all departments and agencies of the state government established the bill reporting system which has now been operating for two annual legislative sessions. In order that the Executive Office may be kept better informed of the current status and content of the measures being considered by the Legislature, the departments are held responsible for submitting to the Executive Office analyses and reports of bills within established time limits at three key stages of the legislative process: (1) upon introduction, (2) upon passage by the house of origin, and (3) upon enrollment pending the Governor's signature.

Responsibility for the referral of each bill to the agency or agencies which may be affected by it is placed with the Department of Administration. Because the Department of Administration performs a major portion of the central staff functions for the state government and, accordingly, serves as a central clearing house of information concerning state operations, it was a logical choice to assist the Governor in legislative clearance matters. The part-time service of one staff member, with clerical assistance, is required to perform this responsibility during the four- to six-month

legislative sessions. This staff member works closely with a counterpart staff member in the Executive Office.

Upon receipt of printed copies of a bill as introduced, the Department of Administration determines what agencies may be affected by the bill and transmits a copy to each such agency with a request for a report on its content. Upon the adoption of a bill by the house in which it was introduced, as indicated by the daily legislative journals, a further request is made for a follow-up report covering any amendments to the bill. The reporting agency is responsible for determining what changes, if any, were made in the bill. Finally, upon passage by both houses of the Legislature the printed enrolled bill is submitted to the reporting agencies for final analysis.

Agencies are requested to include in their analyses the following information: (1) what the bill proposes to do, (2) whether or not it is an agency-sponsored measure or otherwise has its support, (3) what fiscal implications the bill contains, (4) what other agencies the bill might affect, (5) what advantages the bill has, and (6) what objections the agency has to it and what amendments are suggested to meet them. Analyses are submitted in triplicate directly to the Executive Office which routes one copy to the Department of Administration. Special reports which may be required because of the importance or the controversial nature of any particular bill are requested directly by the Executive Office.

The report on the bill as introduced is to be submitted within ten days of the date of referral by the Department of Administration. The time limits for reporting on the bill as passed by the house of origin and as enrolled are seven days respectively. Undoubtedly, the most vital time limit is that for the analysis of enrolled bills, since the Governor has ten days, Sundays excepted, in which to reach a decision on signing these bills.

In order to expedite its business the Michigan Legislature has by rule established deadlines for each stage of the legislative process which result in sudden death for bills not acted upon by those dates. Legislative calendars lengthen considerably at these deadlines and large groups of bills pass through stages of the legislative process in rapid succession.

Bills just introduced may die in committee before the ten-day time limit for agency reply has elapsed, or bills may move from one stage of referral to the next within the time limit established for the first referral. These practices serve to defeat the time limits established for referrals at introduction and upon passage by the house of origin.

The Department of Administration has undertaken no formal follow-up for overdue analyses of bills as introduced and as passed by the house of origin. The Executive Office undertakes follow-up directly with the reporting agencies. However, the Executive Office is not informed of the particular referrals to agencies made by the Department of Administration at these stages. During the early weeks of the legislative session, check lists of referrals for which no replies have been received by the Department of Administration are furnished to the Executive Office for follow-up, but speeding up of activity by the Legislature in later weeks makes such lists burdensome and largely obsolete at the moment they are prepared. Follow-up, therefore, is undertaken by the Executive Office only when it has need for an analysis of the bill and finds none in its files. For the most part, agency compliance with the time limits is good. Although the practice on follow-up results in loose ends and an occasional hurried request for information, a more formalized procedure might produce an amount of time-consuming paper work which would outweigh the difficulties in spurring the intractable few.

For enrolled bills, however, the Department of Administration submits a copy of each bill to the Executive Office indicating the agency to which it has been referred and the date upon which the reply is due. Close follow-up is maintained by the Executive Office and compliance with the time limit is enforced.

The following table summarizes the work load and comprehensiveness of the bill referral system and the measure of agency compliance with it. Work load for the 1955 session considerably exceeded that for 1954 because of a difference of one month in the length of the session. The figures for the number of bills referred and the total number of referrals to agencies indicate that a significant number of bills affected more than one agency and multiple referrals were made. In each year one or more bills were referred to some seventy state agencies.

A considerable proportion of the bills could not be determined to affect any particular agency of state government and were, therefore, not referred for analysis. On the basis of 1954 experience, the percentage of unreferred bills was greatly reduced in 1955. This residual of unreferred bills was for the most part composed of those dealing with the organization, powers, and administration of county, township, and municipal governments. Except for a few specific areas, such as the judiciary and election administration, no clearing house of information concerning local government exists at the state level. In 1955, a brief statement of apparent content of a bill not referred

Executive Clearance of Bills in the 1954 and 1955 Sessions of the Michigan Legislature

<i>Referral Stage and Session</i>	<i>Number of Bills</i>	<i>Percentage Not Referred to State Agencies</i>	<i>Number of Bills Referred to State Agencies</i>	<i>Total Number of Referrals to State Agencies</i>	<i>Percentage of Replies to Referrals</i>
Introduced					
1954 session	744	28	535	727	87
1955 session	914	14	784	1061	87
Passed by house of origin					
1954 session	344	35	224	274	82
1955 session	413	16	345	498	76
Enrolled					
1954 session	226	27	165	215	92
1955 session	294	24	223	287	83

to an agency was submitted by the Department of Administration to the Executive Office. In the prior year, because of the large volume, reports of nonreferrals were not submitted until the bills had passed the house of origin. The Executive Office also secures analyses of non-referred bills when needed from its own legal assistant or from representatives of the local governments involved.

In 1954 the Attorney General, an elected official, refused to report on bills referred to his office which dealt with court organization and procedure and the general state penal and probate codes. The general election of November, 1954, brought in an Attorney General of the same party as the Governor who cooperated in reporting on these bills during the 1955 session. This is the major factor accounting for the reduction in the number of non-referred bills in 1955.

Included among the bills not referred are the approximately fourteen general appropriation bills introduced during each session. Since the Budget Division of the Department of Administration has always submitted analyses of these bills to the Executive Office as a matter of routine, it has not been considered necessary to superimpose a new bill reporting system.

In the 1955 session the percentage of non-referred bills at the enrolled stage increased over those at the prior two stages. Half of this increase resulted from several less important bills which were signed by the Governor prior to their receipt and referral by the Department of Administration.

Agency cooperation in the system, as indicated by the percentages of referrals for which reports were received, has not been perfect. A majority of the agencies have complied closely with the established procedures. A few have cooperated in spirit if not with the letter of the system by reporting at one stage of the bill and not at another and by submitting reports with much less than comprehensive coverage of the bill. A few agencies have exhibited only a trace of cooperation. In the 1955 session, for instance, one major department was responsible for 25 of the 137 failures to reply to referrals upon introduction, or nearly 20 per cent of the total delinquency.

Because of the more intense follow-up and the importance ascribed to enrolled bills, normally the highest percentage of compliance should occur at that stage as indicated by the 1954 data. Lack of agency interest in less important bills which pass the house of origin in the form in which they were introduced accounts in part, at least, for the lower measure of compliance at the second referral stage. Particularly at the introduction stage, a factor other than lack of cooperation on the part of the agencies accounts for a portion of the failure to reply to referrals of bills. As mentioned previously, the Legislature has established deadlines for action at the various stages of the legislative process. The many bills introduced just before the deadline for clearing bills from the house of origin will either die in committee or be passed by the house of origin almost immediately, thus making analysis of the bill as introduced unnecessary.

The percentage of compliance of state agencies at the introduction stage was identical in 1954 and 1955. At the other two referral stages, 1955 compliance dropped below the 1954 levels, but the differences between the two years may not be too significant. Many factors could cause the disparity and additional years of experience are needed before trends can be charted.

Determination by the Department of Administration of the agencies affected by a particular bill and to whom, therefore, the bill should be referred is in some cases not a simple task. It may be evident that a bill will have primary impact on one agency and secondary or tangential effect on another. In such cases the usual practice is to refer the bill to the second agency no matter how remote the relationship of the bill may seem to be to an agency's functional responsibilities. Failure to receive a reply from this kind of referral is not considered of great importance. As previously noted, agencies are requested to include in their analyses a mention of other agencies to which the bill might be of concern and an effort is made to follow up on such suggestions. Despite the care taken in the referrals of bills, isolated cases arise of an agency objecting to features of a bill which had not been referred to it.

Another problem in the determination of affected agencies is the extent to which bills should be referred to central staff agencies which have a secondary interest in their content. The argument of the Attorney General in refusing to report on certain bills referred to his office in 1954 was that they had no direct relationship to his operating responsibilities and that referral of bills to his office could be carried to the point where he could be requested to comment on the constitutionality of every bill introduced during the session. This position illustrates a general problem facing the agencies with over-all staff or administrative control responsibilities. The budget agency, for example, would be interested in any measures having possible fiscal implications. Because of the large number of such measures, referral of bills having secondary fiscal implications has not been made to the Budget Division, Department of Administration, until the bill has passed the house of origin.

In the establishment and operation of the bill clearance system, major effort has been directed toward systematically placing at the disposal of the Governor a flow of information concerning all bills as they pass through the legislative process. The resulting reservoir of information is invaluable to him in exercising his constitutional power of approval or disapproval of legislation. It also assists him in performing his informal legislative tasks as a leader of a political party in the Legislature, as Chief Executive with at least ultimate responsibility for representing the state administrative agencies before the Legislature, and, finally, as the official to whom the public primarily looks for the direction of the ship of state in both its legislative and its administrative aspects.

No complete centralization at the gubernatorial level of administrative interest in legislative matters has been intended or has resulted from the bill clearance procedures recently adopted. Some departments, particu-

larly the major departments, maintain close surveillance of legislation affecting their jurisdictions. They have representatives who maintain constant liaison with the Legislature and who appear before legislative committees quite independently of the Executive Office. On the other hand, experience has indicated that smaller agencies with less important functional responsibilities pay little independent attention to the legislative process. Such agencies rely heavily upon the new bill clearance system to locate and follow the proposed legislation affecting them.

Although the system as operated during the 1954 and 1955 sessions of the Legislature has substantially strengthened the knowledge at hand about legislation through the establishment of formalized referrals of bills, some problems and inadequacies have appeared. These have been described in preceding paragraphs. Aside from the failure of agencies to comply with the requirements of the system, the inadequacies arise from the lack of omniscience on the part of the person responsible for referring the bills as to what agencies a particular bill will affect, from the log jams and deadlines in the legislative process, and from the conscious effort to develop a system which approaches adequate, if not perfect, attention to the bills with as loose and simple procedures as possible.

The new clearance system requires the expenditure of much energy and time by all concerned, as attested by the mountainous stack of paper collected as the session draws to a close. The high mortality rate of bills produces the feeling that much work is wasted. Yet the Governor may be called upon to discuss even the bill regarded as least likely to succeed. There is now, for the first time, a feeling of security, a feeling that information is on file if needed. The Executive Office has frequently acknowledged the benefits accruing from the system and has praised it as a vast improvement over the situation that preceded it.

Local Participation in Solving a Water Problem

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I

IN RECENT years it has become increasingly obvious that the success of cooperative intergovernmental programs is heavily dependent on the extent and manner of bringing local governmental units and local interests into the planning and execution of the projects. The reasons for this dependence are becoming apparent as more area development plans are put into effect cooperatively. In the first place, the various local units are directly representative of the people upon whom the programs are to have the greatest effect; in essence it is at this level that public opinion favorable to the projects will have to be created if they are to continue to receive legislative support. Closely related to this necessity for creating local popular support for the programs is the fact that, in the planning process which accompanies development, the knowledge of the local residents and their conceptions of the way in which their respective communities should develop are inseparable from the total process of decision-making.

The aim of such programs is dual. From the over-all point of view they are designed as particular aspects of national and state promotion of economic and social growth. From the local point of view they are directed to the enhancement of the economy by increasing the possibilities for maximum use of resources, thereby improving the welfare of the residents and facilitating expansion. The federal-state water control project operating in central and south-

ern Florida since 1949 affords a good opportunity to observe an attempt to bring local efforts fully to bear on the solution to a water problem involving nearly one-third of the state.

The land under development, some 15,000 square miles (approximately one-fourth of the state), consists of the whole or a part of seventeen counties. It includes the almost legendary Everglades, as well as 250 miles along the east coast, 100 miles of which comprises the fabulous eastern "gold coast" beach resort strip running through and including Miami, the state's largest metropolitan area. It contains well over one-third of the state's population. For the most part the south Florida region has the contours of a gigantic saucer whose rim is an encirclement of soft rock. The heavy summer rainfall (50 to 60 per cent of the average rainfall of well over 50 inches falls between June and September) turns the area into a shallow lake or bog except where there are intermittent hammocks of higher land. At the northern edge of the Everglades lies Lake Okeechobee, into which much of the water of central Florida drains through the Kissimmee River and other lesser streams. Although Lake Okeechobee averages approximately twenty-nine miles in diameter, it is a shallow lake which, in the rainy season, tends to rise above its bed and overflow into the lowlands to the south and east, further inundating these areas.

The organic muck soil built up in these south Florida alluvial lands has attracted the

attention of governmental officials and entrepreneurs since the beginnings of white settlement of the state. And the history of Florida since its admission to statehood in 1845 has been replete with public and private attempts to capitalize on the potentialities of the area.

As early as 1848 the federal Treasury sent an agent, Buckingham Smith, to south Florida for a survey. The resulting report concentrated on the problem of drainage; Smith recommended the lowering of the Okeechobee water level about four feet through the construction of drainage canals connecting the lake to the Caloosahatchee and St. Lucie rivers. Before action was taken on this plan, however, the federal Swamp and Overflowed Lands Act of 1850 was passed, and the entire area was ceded to the state. At this period the federal government did not accept responsibility for formulating national policies of reclamation, although it stipulated in the overflowed lands grant that drainage was to be undertaken by the states. Even when the federal government finally reentered the water control picture in southern Florida in the late 1920's, action was taken under the guise of an interest in navigation, and it was not until the flood control legislation of 1936 that national obligation for undertaking multiple-purpose flood control projects was recognized.

State and private interest in drainage of the Everglades did not abate with the withdrawal of active national concern, however. The state consolidated several land grants into a single Internal Improvement Fund and created an ex officio board of trustees to administer the fund. In its early days the board was less concerned with land reclamation than with assisting railroad development. As a result of the default by the railroads on bonds held by the trustees, the Internal Improvement Fund was forced into receivership in the 1870's. In 1881 its straitened circumstances were relieved through the sale of 4 million acres of its land holdings to Hamilton Disston of Philadelphia for \$0.25 an acre. The Disston purchase was the most ambitious attempt ever made by a private company at reclamation of part of the area. Although some lands were opened up for agriculture, by and large the works undertaken were localized in the Kissimmee

Valley and little was achieved toward the rehabilitation of the whole territory.

In a further attempt to fulfill its obligation for drainage and reclamation, the state created the Everglades Drainage District in 1907. Unfortunately, each new public move to reclaim this land was attended by private land speculation which far oversold the potential of the area. Although the Drainage District did effect a number of drainage projects, the failure of private landholders to meet taxes, together with their inability to expend the funds necessary to bring the lands into active production, prevented the district from carrying out works on a sufficient scale to bring the area into full utilization. At no time was the Everglades Drainage District able to build the type of local support which it needed to carry out a comprehensive system of works; instead the pressures for works came from land interests whose concern was with particularized projects designed to benefit their land sales. In the meantime, under a general act of 1913, many uncoordinated local drainage districts were established, thereby further contributing to the alternating land booms and busts without attacking the over-all problems of flood control.

The federal government began to participate actively in Florida's water control program after the 1928 flood. At that time, the Corps of Engineers made some surveys and recommended the expansion of the drainage facilities of the Caloosahatchee River out of Okeechobee. Subsequently the corps received funds through the rivers and harbors appropriations for specific channel and levee projects, although no general water control program was attempted.

The 1929 depression produced chaos so far as the state and local reclamation activities were concerned. By 1932 the Everglades Drainage District and seventy of seventy-three local drainage districts had defaulted on their bonds, and the resulting litigation brought to a halt all attempts by the district to carry out a program of comprehensive works. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation assisted in stabilizing some of the projects, but almost without exception the development schemes remained dormant until after World War II.

As in so many similar cases, a comprehen-

sive water control program for central and south Florida was finally evoked by disaster in the form of the 1947 flood, which covered 3 million acres and caused damage estimated at 59 million dollars. As a result of this catastrophe, the congressional Flood Control Act of 1948 authorized the Corps of Engineers to begin the first phase of a proposed ten-year project in central and southern Florida. The federal act required active state participation both in construction and in administration of the project.

II

FROM the technological point of view, the surveys of the 1930's and 1940's clearly demonstrated the weaknesses of earlier attempts at reclamation. Central and south Florida actually is a single vast watershed which needs to be treated for general water control purposes as a unified area. The mistakes of the past had resulted from a multiplicity of rehabilitation projects in which drainage was regarded as the sole problem. Subsequent experience showed that the balance of nature was more upset than controlled by uncoordinated works and that as a result new problems arose even when drainage works were adequate to carry off surplus water. The lowering of the water tables through overdrainage caused frequent periods of drought which resulted in the oxidation of peat soils, led to muck fires, and endangered the water supply of coastal cities through salt water intrusion.

The federal-state flood control project was designed as a multipurpose attempt to offset these bad effects by simultaneously restoring and controlling nature's balance in this region. Not only would drainage and related works have to be established to control floods, but water conservation areas, irrigation facilities, and salt water barriers would have to be included in the plan. In total effect, the development plan envisaged the use of the various parts of the area for purposes to which they were best suited, thereby avoiding the ravages of overexploitation characteristic of earlier drainage efforts.

The administrative problems were at least as serious as the technical problems, and not the least of these was the securing of the right type of local participation. Although both the state and the national administrative agencies

involved were wedded to the conception of a system of major over-all works designed to meet the worst dangers of floods, provide drainage facilities, create water storage basins, and protect the fresh water supplies of the cities, local cooperation was needed not only for securing popular acceptance of the general program but also for supplementing the over-all works with complementary local development efforts. Because the United States Corps of Engineers has to a great extent been single-mindedly concerned with the construction of major facilities, most of the stimulus to local governmental and private activity has come from the Central and Southern Florida Flood Control District, the agency which was created to fulfill the state obligations in the intergovernmental project.

The act creating the Flood Control District (chapter 25270, *Laws of Florida*, 1949) left no doubt that the state was prepared to alter the past policy of relying heavily on decentralized special districts for much of the planning and development of the region. The enabling legislation was cast in broad terms; the governing board of the district was given full authority to cooperate with the federal government in the program and it was additionally permitted to undertake works supplementary to the comprehensive plan of the Corps of Engineers.

The Flood Control District is organized under a five-man board, with an executive director as the chief administrative officer. It is responsible for the operation and maintenance of all completed projects. The estimated total cost of construction was originally in excess of \$200 million, of which the federal government was supposed to supply about 85 per cent. In addition to a share of construction costs, the state was to provide all land acquisitions and rights of way, relocation work, and operation and maintenance expenses. The costs of the project were estimated to work out during the period of federal participation at about 61 per cent federal contribution and 39 per cent state contribution. Because of increases in costs for construction and for securing rights of way, these original estimates are now out of line. Estimated expenditures for the fiscal year 1955 are over \$9 million.

Although the general flood control policy of the state recognized the importance of con-

tinued local efforts by providing for the creation of subdistricts within the major district, the over-all district is insured against local action which might be at cross purposes with its general program. The governing board of the Central and Southern Florida Flood Control District was given authority to prescribe the manner in which local works may be connected to the works of the district, and it was further declared "unlawful to connect with or make use of the works of said district without consent in writing from its governing board. . . ." By this enabling legislation, the responsible over-all authority was given full opportunity to use its initiative in securing local cooperation in this area development project, while the comprehensive design of major works and their management was protected against the possible bad effects of local actions at variance with the total area program which the experiences of a century had shown to be necessary.

The initiative of the Central and Southern Florida Flood Control District in securing local cooperation and in other administrative actions has been the most striking feature of the entire development project. The district has used its permissive powers to spell out a local policy which has procured grass-roots support for the over-all program, helped to reconcile conflicts within specific localities and among the various counties, secured local suggestions which have reshaped the comprehensive plan, and stimulated local planning designed to procure a balance between the developmental potentialities of the various counties and the desires of the residents. The total result for local action has been the use of a centralized administrative agency for the purpose of securing as much decentralization as the natural factors in the situation permit.

The primary approach to the task of bringing local aspirations and resources fully to bear on the general rehabilitation of the region has been the encouragement of the formation of county advisory committees. These committees have been formed in a variety of ways. In Dade County a special act of the Legislature had already been passed making the Board of Commissioners an ex officio board for a county water district, and the newly created Central and Southern Florida Flood Control District

cooperates in this case with the previously organized committee. However, since much of the area is rural, the Flood Control District frequently has sought the assistance of the Soil Conservation Service district supervisors in promoting the formation of county committees. Where the soil supervisors have been used to stimulate the move toward forming county committees, the establishment of the committees has come either at large-scale meetings, to which everyone possibly concerned has been invited, or by asking civic, trade, and agricultural associations within the counties to appoint representatives to attend the initial meetings. These various approaches to the formation of the committees have been dictated by the circumstances in the particular counties; the most influential determinants have been the attitude of the county commissioners, the homogeneity of the economic and cultural interests within the county, and the zeal of the major producing and consuming associations.

For the same reasons, the size of the committees varies a great deal from county to county. In Dade County the committee, in accordance with the act of the Legislature, is composed of five members. The committees in other counties number from five to thirty-five. Sometimes, the difficulty of procuring a unified opinion on the way in which a county should be developed has resulted in creating a very large committee in order to secure the necessary measure of interest representation. In such cases a smaller executive committee ordinarily is set up to facilitate the functioning of the unwieldy parent committee.

The district's efforts to bring county committees into being has failed in only three counties, and in all three instances only a small segment of the county lies within the boundaries of the district. The Flood Control District assists in the formation of county committees in an extremely diplomatic manner. W. Turner Wallis, executive director of the district, has said: "We early recognized our responsibility to the counties, particularly those that had no immediate prospect of getting any work out of the District. We wanted to learn these people's problems and to explain to them where their tax money was going."

In securing local cooperation to fulfill these responsibilities, the district has been scrupulously careful not to dictate the organizational form of the committees. Indeed, the district does not even insist that a committee be formed, for district officials are well aware that spontaneity is needed in such an undertaking. The skill with which this program has been carried out is illustrated by the remark of a county agent, James Oxford, in the *Cocoa Tribune*: "It is entirely up to the people of Brevard County to make this [the formation of a county committee] program, for the Army Engineers or the Central and Southern Florida Flood Control District do not intend to bring a program into Brevard County and cram it down the people's throats."

After a committee has been formed, the Flood Control District's cooperation with it takes two forms. At the outset, the district describes to the county committee the tentative plans of works in the federal-state project and the benefits to be derived from the program. Second, the district seeks to go beyond education and to put the local committee on a functioning basis. In carrying out this aim of promoting local participation in water control operations, the Flood Control District extends its services to the local committees in several ways. Among other things, the district gives continuing aid to the county committee in providing technical assistance for the development of county water control and use plans, takes under advisement county committee suggestions on the tentative plans for over-all works affecting the particular area, and serves as a liaison between the county and the Corps of Engineers and among the counties themselves.

In its role of educator, the district strives to bring about intelligent grass-roots support. One of its earliest jobs (and one incidentally which clearly demonstrated the need for continuing local committees) was to maintain general popular support for the project despite the fact that priorities for construction were likely to lead to charges of favoritism to certain areas. Officials of the district had to explain throughout the whole area the necessity for undertaking as its first goal works designed primarily to benefit certain areas south of Lake Okeechobee, especially the coastal cities.

In carrying out this difficult educational task, officials of the district pointed out that the large measure of concentration on this area's water problems was motivated by considerations that were overriding. The lands south of the lake had suffered most from the 1947 flood; this was the area about which the most complete data were available; and, more importantly, congressional authorization for the first phase of construction emphasized the works in this area. Not only were other areas less threatened by large-scale disaster than the coastal cities and the farm lands immediately below the lake, but the preliminary research in the form of a geological, land-use, and sociological survey—which precedes comprehensive work plans—was available only for this sector.

It was important that counties not covered in the first phase understand why the initial works were to be concentrated south of the lake and, additionally, it was highly desirable that the counties not immediately scheduled for development should begin to prepare for the future activities within their areas. If early attention had not been given to this problem many county committees might have felt that they had nothing to gain from participation in the district. Had this attitude arisen, it might have proved disastrous for the district's future because legislative apportionment in Florida is heavily weighted on the side of the rural counties.

III

THE district's efforts to develop intelligent local support and assistance have been in large part successful. Regularly, before each legislative session, the district and county committees hold meetings to encourage legislators to support the program. County committees, also, on occasion, memorialize both the state Legislature and Congress for financial assistance for the over-all program. The real proof of the success of its educational endeavor lies in the fact that no really hindering opposition to the district has arisen in the seventeen counties concerned.

The second and more direct phase of local participation which has been developed through cooperation between the district and the local areas has been in the important field of planning. In order that county committees

not only recognize their problems of water control and use but also have an intelligent idea of how these problems can be solved, the district encourages them to engage in local developmental planning. In the first place, the district encourages the county committee to draw up an over-all county plan and a program for land use and to undertake other studies of the county which might serve the long-range aspects of the water program. Through these actions the county can make worth-while suggestions to the district and can better appreciate its own position in the comprehensive plan. In order to provide the necessary technical machinery to facilitate planning, the district endeavors to get the county committee to set up a technical advisory group or, if this is not feasible, at least to employ an advisory engineer. On several occasions, the district has either lent one of its engineers to the county or has paid all or most of the cost of hiring a private engineer. In such cases the district provides all of the data it can to the county, including, of course, district plans for the over-all engineering program.

The scope and thoroughness of committee planning vary a great deal among the counties. In counties like Dade, with its superior financial resources, very extensive planning has been done. Without going into the technical details of the Dade County plan, it can be pointed out that the county committee, through its engineering department, has made thorough studies of geological formations, land use, and climatic factors and has come up with recommendations for a program of action that parallels the comprehensive plan in some cases and deviates from it in others. For example, the Dade County Committee, after extensive study, has made a detailed, step-by-step analysis of canal design for the area and has suggested changes in the comprehensive plan where the committee feels changes are required. The committee has been instrumental in securing desirable changes in the location of drainage canals and flood gates in the area.

Other counties, less urbanized and more diversified, have also done valuable planning. Saint Lucie, a relatively small agricultural county, has formed a water Resources and Conservation Committee, with the aim of overcoming "the water problems of Saint Lucie

County through a series of projects involving the cooperation of local, state and national individuals and agencies." Specifically, the committee's activities have been extensive in such assorted fields as water hyacinth control; provision of water supplies for its principal city, Fort Pierce; development of an ownership-hydrological-geological survey; and obtaining of easement rights. As a long-range and more comprehensive step in local development, the Saint Lucie County Committee has developed a program for future studies and for local water control works construction.

The committees in other counties within the district are only now arriving at a level of activities and planning comparable to that already reached in Saint Lucie County. Unquestionably, as more data become available, and as the district is able to provide more assistance to the counties, local interest in other counties will be stepped up. A new policy, adopted in 1954 and predicated on experience, is designed to serve as a stimulus to county participation. This policy sets up criteria for considering requests for local participation in planning secondary works. Under it, if participants are willing to furnish rights of way and 50 per cent of construction costs, the district will undertake to furnish the remaining 50 per cent of construction, while retaining the right of approval on maintenance and operation of these works by the local unit. The district also reaffirmed, in a later resolution of 1954, that it would, in cooperation with the local committees, seek to develop local plans and even to utilize these plans in considering alterations in the authorized major works of the federal-state plan. In several instances local desires expressed in the form of county development plans have played instrumental roles in the alteration of specific aspects of the area comprehensive plan.

There have been, of course, some conflicts between interests or areas within counties, even though the over-all district program has won almost unanimous acceptance. In Broward County, for example, urban land developers have come into conflict with farmers over certain lands. Moreover, there is a fundamental cleavage of interests among the urban areas, the citrus producers, the truck farmers, the cattlemen, and the sportsmen. Each major

economic or social interest has a different view of water levels and water uses. In general, as elsewhere in the United States, first consideration has been given to human needs, particularly protection against disastrous floods and preservation of urban water supply. After this, however, committees have attempted to provide a water level that will at least partially satisfy all groups concerned. Fortunately, centralization has been a boon in solving water level problems, because the district's comprehensive plans, though flexible to some degree, provide an over-all limitation on the more extreme demands of the individual counties. The secondary drainage channel system, for example, must conform to the engineering plans of the district and the Corps of Engineers unless these agencies can be persuaded to change their plans. Where the interests are especially adamant, the county committees have resorted to subcommittees to study the problems, relying on technical advisory groups to provide the scientifically best solution. Naturally, the problems have not always been solved; some county committees are only now beginning to overcome differences of opinion, while others have lagged in providing the studies on which satisfactory solutions depend.

Intercounty problems, surprisingly, have not been any more difficult to solve than interest group conflicts. As a district employee has put it: "All realize that problems don't stop at county lines." Though the district has used its general powers to deal with problems embracing more than one county, some multicounty committees have been set up on an informal basis. Glades, Hendry, and Lee counties have formed a nine-man, three-county committee to deal with common problems. Moreover, they have used local engineers as advisers in all three counties, and these engineers have been invaluable in helping this committee to formulate and attempt to deal with intercounty problems. A multicounty Hyacinth Committee has also been formed to deal with the general problem of waterway clogging by these plants. It is anticipated that, as future intercounty problems arise, new multicounty committees will be formed, with the end result that geographic rather than political subdivision lines will determine the composition of local committees. It would probably have been desirable

from the beginning to secure local cooperation on the basis of small watershed areas or in some cases along economic interest lines, rather than to rely largely on committees constricted by the boundaries of historical counties. But the fact that the counties existed and that people were identified with them made it politically feasible to begin working with the county and to proceed from there to the creation of other forms of local cooperation more concerned with the functional specialization of water control administration.

IV

SUNSHINE and water in great abundance constitute the most important natural resources of central and southern Florida. Alternation between an excess of first one and then the other of these bounties of nature has always been the problem confronting those desiring to reclaim the region. The gradual change of public policy on reclamation from reliance on local government and private attempts at development to a position in which natural geographic areas are the primary determinant of the governmental level at which the program is administered was a necessary precursor to a realistic project for water control. But the recognition and treatment of the region as a unified problem in water control in which both the national and the state governments had an interest was only the first step in moving toward a practical approach to water administration in the area. The rich diversity of the social, economic, and geographic factors called for an allocation of governmental responsibility and authority in relation to the dual requirements of scientific knowledge and human demands; and this combination in turn called for the integration of private and public action both vertically and horizontally.

In most respects the solutions of the problems of regional development have reflected the great changes which have occurred in conservation policy. For more than seventy-five years a limited and uncoordinated approach to development stood in the way of the construction of a planned system of major works. This emphasis on local responsibility meant that no administrative area could be laid out

and vested by national or state governments (or a combination of the two) with authority for effecting a general water control program. At higher levels of government only advice and consultation were possible, and political factors prevented their most effective use. Once the authority for programing major works in water control was centralized sufficiently to enable the responsible agencies to deal with the technical problems, however, the immediate administrative, or rather politico-administrative problem, was the securing of local popular support. And, as is true in all development programs, only when the major works began to come into existence were the full potentialities of all of the aspects of the project envisaged by the administrators. With this opening of prospects through the expansion of established features of the plan and the addition of new ones, the necessity of bringing local governments and private interests into the actual work of reclamation was perceived and acted upon.

In a sense, the administration of water resources in central and southern Florida has revolved full cycle. From the inability to handle the technical problems because of extreme decentralization, the position has changed to a point where the projection of the centrally applied technical solutions to their full extent can occur only by drawing the local areas and their various interest groups into the administrative process. If, like the planning technique of which it is a part, this securing of local cooperation is never complete, and if the means by which it can be achieved are severely limited by political, technical, and administrative factors which are less malleable than might be desired, it must nevertheless be attempted if the regional transformation envisaged by the administrator is to occur. The Central and Southern Florida Flood Control District is not only aware of these problems; it has made a concentrated effort to solve them, and has, to a considerable extent, been successful in doing so.

The Enduring Values of Our Federal System

... experience amply justifies the view that our federal system, with the degree of flexibility that it permits, can be adapted to crises of the present and future as successfully as it has been to those of the past. As an instrument of positive government, it possesses—at least for a nation as large and diverse as ours—a clear advantage over a strongly centralized government. In helping to bolster the principle of consent; in facilitating wide participation in government; in furnishing training grounds for leaders; in maintaining the habit of local initiative; in providing laboratories for research and experimentation in the art of government; in fostering competition among lower levels of government; in serving as outlets for local grievances and for political aspirations—in all of these and many other ways, the existence of many relatively independent and responsible governments strengthens rather than weakens our capacity for government. On the whole, therefore, the enduring values of our federal system fully warrant every effort to preserve and strengthen its essence.

—The Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *A Report to the President* . . . (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 3.

Records Disposition in the Federal Government

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THERE are at the present time almost 25 million cubic feet of federal records. The recent report of the Hoover Commission on *Paperwork Management* has focused attention on the problems presented by the creation of some 25 billion pieces of paper each year. The commission places at \$4 billion the yearly cost of handling this vast accumulation which it points out is sufficient to reach to the moon not once but thirteen times.

After consideration of these astronomical figures it is unlikely that anyone will question the need for systematic disposal of as many of these records as possible as soon as their usefulness is at an end. The problem is to sift the wheat from the chaff so that the relatively few valuable papers can be retained.

The beginnings of this problem date roughly from the invention of the typewriter and the use of carbon copies. It is difficult for those of us concerned with modern government to recall that only about 150 years ago the Secretary of State was handling personally with only the assistance of a few clerks all of the correspondence of his department. When letters were written and copied by hand the retention of all of them was scarcely a problem.

Interest in disposal of federal records was not really necessary until the Civil War brought about the first sizable increase in their volume. More destruction than was desirable had occurred during the first half of the nineteenth century through fire and neglect. Early recommendations for improvements in the condition of the records had all centered about the establishment of a national archives to house them properly. But by the 1870's agencies were beginning to complain of the clutter

of useless papers in office and storage space. In 1872 the Secretary of the Treasury complained that his records were increasing by over 7,000 cubic feet a year. (In 1954 the Treasury Department created about 350,000 cubic feet of records.) Congress, in 1881, authorized the Postmaster General to sell as waste paper records no longer needed for current business and having "no permanent value or historical interest."

In 1889 an act "to authorize and provide for the disposition of useless papers in the Executive Departments" was passed which provided the machinery whereby all agencies could dispose of unneeded papers. Soon after, the Treasury Department disposed of 400 tons of paper and the Post Office of 70 tons.

Many agencies failed to dispose of their records, however, or applied for authority only infrequently. Instead they continued to fill up attics and basements. When these did not suffice, whole buildings were set aside for storage. By the 1930's the Quartermaster General was using Fort Myer and the Schuylkill Arsenal for storage and the old records inherited by the General Accounting Office were filling several warehouses. Records of World War I agencies helped to swell the mass. When the U.S. Food Administration records, 1917-19, were transferred to the National Archives it was noted that they required more space than the records of the Department of State for the years 1789 to 1910.

With the establishment of the National Archives in 1934 and the passage of the Records Disposal Act in 1943 the present system of disposing of federal records was set up.

Periodically agencies review their records

and prepare or amend lists or schedules of them. Until recently these schedules covered only items proposed for disposal immediately or after specified periods of time. Since 1950, as a result of the Federal Records Act, agencies have been required to prepare records control schedules which list and describe all program records of the agency including those to be kept as well as those to be destroyed. The same act gave to the administrator of the General Services Administration authority to issue regulations on records and to review the activities of the agencies in records disposal as well as in other phases of records management.

The schedules are prepared in the agencies, usually by their records staff. Each schedule is signed by a designated official whose signature indicates that the document meets the administrative and legal needs of the agency.

Four copies of the schedule are forwarded to the National Archives which has authority to disapprove the destruction of any records it considers of permanent research value to the public or of value to other agencies. The National Archives' appraisal statement, indicating what records need to be retained, is added to the schedule.

The schedule is then submitted to the Congress where it is referred to the Joint Committee on the Disposition of Executive Papers. This committee, of two senators and two representatives, makes brief reports, listing the schedules by number and agency and approving or disapproving the recommended disposal. If favorable, the committee report constitutes disposal authority. The agency is then required to carry out the disposal provisions of the schedule, unless it can show that circumstances have arisen requiring changes in the plan.

Two copies of the schedule remain with the Congress and one is retained in the National Archives. The fourth copy is returned to the agency where it serves as the plan for handling the records.

In addition to the records schedules prepared in the agencies, the General Services Administration develops what are known as general records schedules which cover the housekeeping records that are common to most agencies—the fiscal, procurement, personnel, budget, and similar papers. These sched-

ules, also authorized by Congress, are issued to all agencies and can be used by them subject only to the limitation that approval of the General Accounting Office must be obtained before disposal of records pertaining to claims by or against the government. The general records schedules describe the key personnel, budget, and accounting records that must be kept, as well as the much larger mass of records that after certain periods can be destroyed.

The significance of the schedules is that they constitute the plan for preserving and destroying agency records. They are important documents in that they show the decisions of the agency, the National Archives, and the Congress on (1) what records are to be kept permanently for future historical and other research purposes; (2) what records are disposable and when; and (3) when the various groups are to be moved from offices to make way for new files.

These decisions are not reached lightly. The agency has to consider its present and future administrative and legal needs. The National Archives must forecast future research needs and determine the current needs of other agencies of the government and the public. The Congress approves or disapproves these decisions.

Early disposal schedules were merely lists of clearly useless papers, sometimes itemized almost paper by paper or form by form. They were difficult, sometimes impossible, to apply because frequently a disposable form was stapled to an important document. Few offices had the time to "weed" useless papers from their files.

Current schedules describe records by broad categories or series. They consider the value of the whole series rather than of each paper within it. As a result, for example, corporation tax returns and the papers filed with them can be described in a four-line entry. The records themselves occupy some 80,000 cubic feet of space. Classification dockets maintained similarly by all of the Selective Service local boards throughout the country can be described in a single item. The same retention period applies to all of them.

The most difficult and important part of the scheduling process is the determination of the values of the records. The Records Disposal

Act of 1943 specifically mentions three kinds of values that records may have: administrative, legal, and research. Any given file may have all three kinds, perhaps in varying degree, or it may have only one or two of them.

A file's administrative value is its value in carrying on the activities of the agency or of the government as a whole. All records have some administrative value for a period of time or they would not be created. Those pertaining to uncompleted actions are of administrative value to the agency, since their loss would impede the carrying on of its activities. Those of completed actions, on the other hand, may lose quickly their administrative value to the agency.

The period of time during which a record retains this value may be long or short, depending on the purpose it serves. Certain records, such as directives, orders, regulations, and legal opinions, have long-term administrative value because they continue to prescribe and affect the activities of the agency.

Other records have administrative value for varying lesser periods of time. Many fiscal records must be retained for accounting and other purposes for periods of ten or twelve years. On the other hand, an answered letter may never again be referred to. Records showing work schedules and assignments may lose their usefulness as soon as the work is done. The administrative values of most records fall in this short-term category.

Records may have legal value to the federal government or to individual citizens, corporations, or even state and other governments. As in the case of administrative value, the duration of the period during which this legal value exists varies with the kind of right or legal question that is involved. There is enduring legal value to the government in laws and regulations and interpretations of them and in treaties and other international agreements. Similarly, for the government as well as others there is legal value in records establishing title to real estate and defining recapture rights or reservations set forth in land titles. On the other hand, the legal value to the government of contracts and claims records diminishes very rapidly after final settlement of the contract or claim, and ceases altogether upon expiration of pertinent statutes of limitation.

Of legal value primarily to individuals are records of naturalization proceedings and of service in the armed forces; such records retain their value through the life span of more than one generation. On the other hand, the legal value to individuals of patent records and many court decisions ceases to exist after the patent has expired or the court's order has been carried out. Often, of course, the legal value to the federal government and to the individual will expire simultaneously, as in the case of records relating to contracts and to claims by or against the government.

In a sense, the research value in records may be considered "all other values" in addition to those noted above, and to a degree all records have some research value. In considering research value we have to realize, however, that papers cannot be saved merely for the casual interest they may hold for the curious or because someone in the future may conceivably take a private interest in the information they contain. There must be more practical reasons for determining that records have research usefulness.

Research value may be said to result from the fact that the records tell a story or present a picture and can be used (1) to reconstruct the activities of the agency, (2) to obtain information accumulated by the agency in order to make studies of the past, or (3) to furnish data on which to base new findings or conclusions. Since all of an agency's records contribute to the complete story, the problem is to retain the essential story without burying it in duplication and unnecessary detail.

The National Archives, which determines what records have continuing research value, has consistently chosen for retention those files that will enable a student or future administrator to reconstruct the history of the activities of the agency. Although agencies normally describe their accomplishments in published annual or other periodic reports, these are often so brief that they fail to give the complete story. Or they may consciously or unconsciously distort the picture by emphasis on some activities and omission of others. Records showing how the work of the agency was planned, directed, and carried out are usually needed to supplement or correct the bare outlines given in publications. These may be minutes of meetings,

correspondence of heads of agencies or units, organization plans, directives, unpublished reports, and others.

These records, which give the history of the activities and functions of an agency, are needed by the agency itself to understand its own background, often by other agencies or the Congress, and finally by future students. They form a part of the archives of the nation which are essential to an understanding of our national development.

All agencies accumulate information necessary to carry on their functions. Much of it may be of long-time research value for purposes completely different from those for which it was collected. Investigations by the Federal Trade Commission of interlocking directorates or of the coffee industry may have future significance for economic studies. This is also true of materials assembled by the Office of Price Administration for World War II price controls. Similarly, pension records created in the course of administering early nineteenth century pension laws are preserved in the National Archives because of their continuing values for genealogical and other research.

In addition to their usefulness for studies of past actions, records may be used to provide data on which to base new findings and conclusions. This is particularly true of the technical data which are assembled in the course of government research in a wide range of specialized scientific and other fields. At times these technical data are not fully utilized and the results are not set forth in publications or other convenient forms. It may then be necessary to retain the records indefinitely as sources from which new findings and conclusions can be drawn. Among records of this type acquired by the National Archives are nineteenth century meteorological reports and ocean weather observations, including the famous Maury logs, still used by the Weather Bureau in its search for a better understanding of weather conditions.

As a result of the work being done on appraisal and scheduling of records the following pattern is emerging. The National Archives is accepting for permanent preservation only the key program records of an agency or of the government and those considered to be of continuing legal and research value.

Of the nearly 25 million cubic feet of records in existence, less than 1 million are in the National Archives. They represent the historical records from the beginnings of the government to about 1940. The National Archives devotes its efforts to arranging, describing, and servicing these records for the benefit of the government and private researchers who need to use them.

Since 1950, records required for short or long periods but not permanently are transferred when no longer needed in the agencies to federal records centers. Here they are serviced until they have reached their allotted age and can be disposed of. The establishment of these centers has relieved the National Archives of the burden of accepting and caring for material of temporary value merely because no other depository was available.

The centers also receive permanent material less than twenty-five years old to be held until time for its transfer to the National Archives. They also receive material on which no decision has been reached on retention or disposal. The centers, located in ten regions throughout the country, hold many field records that are needed only temporarily. It is possible that as time goes on certain records of particular interest to certain localities will remain in the regional centers rather than in the National Archives.

About 2.5 million cubic feet of records are now in federal records centers. It is expected that the size of the center holdings will remain relatively stable with the records disposed of and those sent on to the National Archives balancing the new ones coming in.

More needs to be done to reduce the mass of the 21.5 million cubic feet of records remaining in agencies. Last year for the first time slightly more records were disposed of than were created.

The Hoover Commission points out that this volume can be reduced further by the creation of fewer records in the first place. In many agencies correspondence, reports, and forms have been allowed to grow like Topsy. Clarification of needs, simplification of records, and elimination of the unnecessary and overlapping items can reduce the size of files and the cost of office operations and will bring about savings in time and increased efficiency.

Contemporary Topics

Compiled by Opal D. David,
Public Administration Clearing House

Intergovernmental Relations Report

The report of the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations was formally presented to President Eisenhower by Chairman Meyer Kestnbaum and commission members on June 28, 1955. In a message transmitting the report to Congress that day, the President noted that the commission was "the first official body appointed to study and report on the general relationship of the National Government to the States and their local units. Consequently, [it] wisely devoted much of its time to an examination of the general nature of our Federal system, and of the means whereby it can be made to work more effectively."

The President promised to see that recommendations of the commission entailing action by the executive branch received careful consideration and commended to the attention of the Congress and of state and local executives and legislatures the recommendations pertaining to them.

Part I of the report contains a comprehensive review of the origins of our federal system; the forces that have influenced its growth and

development; the place of the states and their political subdivisions in the federal system and the factors—fiscal and nonfiscal—that limit their competence; the extent of the national government's responsibilities and the conditions that justify national action; and the nature and workings of the many forms of national-state cooperation.

Part II contains the findings and recommendations of the commission in a number of functional areas involving a significant degree of intergovernmental relationship and sizable financial assistance from the national government to the states or their subdivisions. The commission did not attempt to deal with questions of whether particular functions should be performed by government at all or with substantive questions of policy in the various functional fields. Its attention was directed entirely to the problems of intergovernmental relations in each field and the focal question of which level of government should have the primary responsibility for the performance of each function.

The commission *Report* may be purchased

A Study Committee Report on Federal Aid to Agriculture	\$0.20
A Study Committee Report on Federal Aid to Highways20
A Study Committee Report on Federal Aid to Public Health25
A Study Committee Report on Federal Aid to Welfare40
A Study Committee Report on Federal Responsibility in the Field of Education50
A Study Committee Report on Unemployment Compensation and Employment Service35
A Study Committee Report on Natural Resources and Conservation20
A Study Committee Report on Payments in Lieu of Taxes and Shared Revenues60
An Advisory Committee Report on Local Government30
A Subcommittee Report on Natural Disaster Relief20
A Staff Report on Civil Defense and Urban Vulnerability20
A Staff Report on Federal Aid to Airports50
A Description of Twenty-Five Federal Grant-in-Aid Programs55
Summaries of Survey Reports on the Administrative and Fiscal Impact of Federal Grants-in-Aid40
A Survey Report on the Impact of Federal Grants-in-Aid on the Structure and Functions of State and Local Governments	1.50

from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Price \$1.25. Study committee and staff reports prepared for the use of the commission in the development of its final report are printed separately and may be purchased from the Government Printing Office at the prices indicated on page 222.

Not included in the printed series is a selected bibliography, *Intergovernmental Relations in the United States—Interlevel and Interjurisdictional Relations*, prepared for the commission by W. Brooke Graves, of the Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress. Copies of this document in mimeographed form have been distributed to a considerable number of government and university libraries throughout the United States.

Hoover Commission Reports

The Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government issued its *Final Report* on June 29. Unlike the report of the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, delivered to President Eisenhower the previous day, the Hoover Commission's final report contains practically none of the substance of the body's findings and recommendations. These are contained in the more than thirty separate commission reports and task force reports which have been issued over a period of months and transmitted to the Congress. (All the reports of both the first and second Hoover Commissions are addressed to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives and have been transmitted directly to the Congress. The report of the Kestnbaum Commission, on the other hand, is addressed to the President of the United States and was delivered to him by the members of the commission "for transmittal to the Congress." This difference, which is in accordance with the language of the acts establishing the commissions, constitutes an interesting footnote for students of legislative-executive relationships.)

The final Hoover Commission report describes the scope and organization of the commission's work and includes various general explanatory statements and statistical summaries. An appendix to the report contains separate

statements by Styles Bridges, Clarence J. Brown, Chet Holifield, and John L. McClellan, the four congressional members of the commission, indicating their right to disagree with recommendations of the commission when they come before them as members of Congress. Congressman Holifield's statement raises some basic questions about the appropriate use of this type of statutory commission, with membership drawn from the Congress, the executive branch, and private life.

The report notes that the recommendations of the commission fall into three categories: 50 which might be presented to the Congress by the President under the Reorganization Act of 1949 as amended or which might be accomplished by Executive order; 145 "administrative recommendations" which are within the authority of the various departments and agencies to adopt; and 167 "legislative recommendations" which will require legislative action.

The President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization, headed by Nelson A. Rockefeller, is reviewing all of the reports and recommendations of the commission for President Eisenhower, and the director of the budget requested the heads of all the executive departments and establishments to review each of the reports within thirty days after its release for the purpose of determining the application to their agencies of the commission's recommendations. Statements are then to be submitted to the President, through the Bureau of the Budget, indicating the extent to which the recommendations can be put into effect and the method suggested for accomplishing this end.

The act creating the commission provided that "The Final Report of the Commission may propose such constitutional amendments, legislative enactments and administrative actions as in its judgment are necessary to carry out its recommendations." Under this authority a legislative drafting service was set up and a number of drafts were prepared along lines indicated by the commission recommendations. However, the *Final Report* states that "it should be clearly understood that the Commission has not considered, approved, or adopted any specific draft legislation in connection with any of its reports nor can any of the draft legislation submitted be considered an official in-

terpretation or specification of what the Commission meant in any of its recommendations."

A complete list of commission and task force reports, with prices, may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. The *Final Report* may be secured from the same source for \$0.25.

Senior Civil Service Proposals

Legislative proposals designed to carry out the recommendations of the Hoover Commission for the establishment of a senior civil service have been introduced in both houses of Congress. H.R. 6549 was introduced May 27 by Congressman Frank Thompson (D) of New Jersey. S. 2331 was introduced June 27 by Senator Frank Carlson (R) of Kansas. The two bills are identical in most respects, but there are several variations, some of which reflect differences between the commission's final report on *Personnel and Civil Service* and the more detailed task force report.

The Thompson bill provides, in line with the task force report, that administration of the new senior service should be vested in an autonomous senior civil service board consisting of the chairman of the Civil Service Commission, the director of the Bureau of the Budget, or their designated deputies, and three persons appointed from private life by the President. The Carlson bill, following the language of the final report, would place the board within the Civil Service Commission. The task force report emphasized the importance of the board's autonomy during the launching period but suggested that this arrangement should be reconsidered at the end of ten years, at which time the program might be taken over by the Civil Service Commission.

The Thompson bill, like the task force report, provides that members of the senior civil service accused of misconduct are entitled to a hearing by the senior civil service board before final action may be taken removing them from the roster of the senior service. The Carlson bill, like the final report, omits this provision.

The two bills are in agreement on maintaining the size of the senior civil service at between 1,500 and 3,000, with the exact number to be determined from time to time by the

President; on selection procedures; on the general obligation of members of the service to refrain from political activity and to accept assignment to any position in the United States or abroad; and on the application of reduction in force and retirement provisions to members of the group.

Brookings Executive Development Program

A two-year experiment in executive development for top career officials of the federal civil service will be started this fall under the auspices of the Brookings Institution in Washington, D. C., and with financial support from The Ford Foundation.

Tentative plans call for a series of executive conferences of several weeks' duration devoted to off-the-job professional study of federal government operations and the functions of federal executives. Participants in the conferences will be nominated by their agencies and the final selection will be made by an interdepartmental committee in collaboration with the staff of the Brookings Institution. About twenty to thirty officials will participate in each conference.

In announcing the program, Brookings President Robert D. Calkins described it as "an effort to provide for the senior civil servant the sort of developmental opportunities now provided by the business community for corporation executives and by the military services for outstanding senior officials." Its emphasis, he said, will be on "the special requirements of administrators in the public service at the level of GS-15 and up. The purpose is to supplement existing training offered by universities and agency programs."

The need for such a program has been under study by Brookings for more than a year. During this period the Civil Service Commission completed a survey of career executives in seven agencies and the results of this study were taken into consideration in the development of the Brookings program.

The Civil Service Commission findings, based on 803 responses to a questionnaire, indicate that a high percentage of these government career executives entered the service in the lower grades and served without a break in service, generally staying in the same agency,

often in the same bureau. Although almost half of them took some college work after entering the service, the replies show that 40 per cent of the group never had a course in economics; 60 per cent never had a course in political science or government; and 67 per cent have had no courses in public or business administration.

In response to questions concerning the type of training they would like, the group voted heavily for formal training in public administration, business administration, and personnel management. They voted this way regardless of the fields in which they were employed. The group expressed definite opposition to the idea of week end and evening training in the event a staff college should be established. Forty-seven per cent said they would prefer five weeks of training off the job.

The new Brookings program represents a revival of the training function of the Brookings Institution, which is now in its fortieth year as a private, nonprofit research and training organization. In the 1920's, the Robert Brookings Graduate School of Economics and Government offered graduate training in the social sciences in preparation for government service. A fellowship program continued to World War II. After the war, a five-year program of seminars on foreign policy problems was conducted by the Institution. Earlier this year, the fellowship program was resumed with awards to three political scientists.

Appraisal Panel Rating Method

A pamphlet describing the use of appraisal panels to identify and develop the potential executive talent of federal employees has recently been made available by the Civil Service Commission to all federal agencies. Under the appraisal plan, panels of three or four persons, always including the employee's supervisor acting as chairman, are set up to rate the total per-

formance and potential abilities of the employee. The employee is then asked to follow a developmental plan suggested by the panel. This may include self-help, agency assistance, planned work experience, and formal training.

The new appraisal panel system follows a pattern already in use to some extent in private industry and in a few federal agencies where it is reported to have had a conspicuous success. In one agency, the commission reports, a three-month trial program for a group of sixty volunteers was so successful that the agency immediately expanded it to apply to all volunteers at grade GS-9 and above. Within nine months, 500 applications had been received.

The new pamphlet is the eighth in a series published by the commission on the general theme of Personnel Management. Titles and prices of the entire series are noted below. All are available from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C.

Presidential Libraries

Congress has adopted legislation providing a statutory basis for the acceptance and maintenance under our national archives system of papers and other historical materials of any President or former President of the United States. Based on identical resolutions (H.J. Res. 330, 331, and 332) introduced by the majority and minority leaders of the House and by Congressman Edward H. Rees (R) of Kansas, the new statute also provides for acceptance of other papers relating to and contemporary with any President or former President and acceptance of land, buildings, and equipment to be used as presidential archival depositories and of gifts or bequests of money or other property to be used for maintenance.

Although the new provisions are designed as general legislation, the immediate occasion for their enactment was to enable the government

How to Conserve Stenographic and Typing Skills	\$0.05
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Employment and Compensation of Experts and Consultants15
The Government Personnel System15
Recognizing Employees through Incentive Awards15
Evaluating Your Personnel Management35
Improving Orientation Programs15
Developing Management Potential through Appraisal Panel15

to accept the land, building, and equipment being donated by the Harry S. Truman Library. The papers of former President Franklin D. Roosevelt at Hyde Park have already been transferred under special legislation and this library is now operated as a government facility. The papers of former President Hoover were donated to the Hoover Institute and Library at Stanford University.

Presidential papers have always been considered the personal property of the man in office, to be disposed of as he saw fit, but by the time President Hoover left office the operations of the federal government were so large and complex that the assistance of trained archivists was needed to manage the accumulated material. In June, 1934, Congress passed legislation creating the office of Archivist of the United States, and members of the National Archives staff have taken an active interest in developing the present program.

Enactment of the new legislation remedies the lack of systematic arrangements for the preservation and use of presidential papers and makes it possible for our Chief Executives to plan for the preservation of their papers at the place of their choice. If the present practice is continued of locating the libraries in or near the family homes of the Presidents, there will be a number of these centers all around the United States, each housing within one establishment a comprehensive collection of material that will help to interpret the history of a President and his period. At the same time, it will be integrated into a national system so as to facilitate research in American history.

New Look for Official Register

The *Official Register of the United States*, 1954 was issued in a paper cover instead of buckram as the result of a suggestion made by an employee of the Civil Service Commission who was responsible for the issuance of the *Register* for several years. The *Register*, which the commission is required by law to publish annually, lists administrative and supervisory employees in the three branches of the federal government and the District of Columbia with their titles and salaries.

Use of the paper cover is the most drastic face-lifting the *Register* has experienced in the

138 years during which it has recorded—first at biennial and later at annual intervals—the offices held by many important figures in American history. The original 1816 edition of 175 pages contrasts sharply with the current 770-page version which contains approximately 28,000 names and has a circulation of nearly 8,000.

The change from buckram to paper made possible a substantial reduction in the price of the book this year without in any way impairing its usefulness, since most users dispose of the old copy as soon as the new issue is available. The commission employee who suggested the change received a certificate and a cash award under the provisions of the Federal Incentive Awards Program initiated last year. It was the first award made for a suggestion resulting in benefits to more than one federal agency.

World War II Housing Story

What is described as "one of the most complex housing stories in the nation's history" is told in the May *Journal of Housing*, monthly magazine of the National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials. The article, "1940-1955, the Story of World War II Housing from Construction to Disposition," traces the twofold efforts of the nation: first, to provide homes for the thousands upon thousands of families who migrated to man the war plants; and then, once the war job was over, to return to the normal buyer-seller housing market. Originally, there were almost a million units built for war housing. Of that number, slightly more than 130,000 are left to be disposed of by the end of this year.

"New towns"—entire communities that came to life on raw land in a matter of months—were one of the most spectacular aspects of the war housing program. Among these was Vanport City, Oregon, a town of 10,000 temporary units for 40,000 persons, built in one year and eleven days. This town was demolished by flood in 1948, and unused temporary war housing buildings were rushed to the area to shelter flood victims.

Another "new town" was Willow Run, near Detroit, built to house more than 20,000 war workers. It became home for returning vet-

erans at the war's end. By 1946, 1,200 married students at the University of Michigan were living there and more were coming in at the rate of about 50 families a month. Then, with the Korean emergency in 1950, a new force of defense workers moved in and went to work in nearby industries. They are the residents of Willow Run today. They are the ones for whom the governing body of the local township has decided to help rebuild Willow Run into a permanent, well-planned community.

About half of the more than 440,000 temporary units were built on the west coast. Once they had served their purpose of housing war workers or veterans, they took on other functions. Some were bought by persons living in rural areas for rehabilitation into homes. In Seattle, purchasers paid \$600 for the house "shell" that the temporary unit offered, spent another \$300 to move it to another site, and paid \$1,500 more for remodeling. In Phoenix, Arizona, and Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, temporaries were converted to use as low-rent public housing. The federal government to date has disposed of all but about 50,000 temporaries.

Permanent war housing—much of it built in the Atlantic seaboard states—was disposed of in large part in sales as cooperatives or mutuals to groups of veterans. There remain about 72,000 of the original 182,000 permanent units to be disposed of and a program is under way to sell those units within the next few months.

Housing units built for the Korean defense emergency add another tangle to the World War II housing disposition story. More than 15,500 such units were built under the 1951 defense housing act. Already, some 2,500 have been removed.

Other disposition activities, dealt with in the *Journal* article under "miscellaneous," concern: (1) the Ohio low-rental program, held in federal ownership for several years, pending settlement of a state constitutional problem, and now returned to Ohio housing authorities; (2) the subsistence homestead program that dates back to the early 1930's, now down to only 8 units; (3) the three "greentowns"—totaling about 2,200 units—all of which were sold after disposition rules were set in 1949; and (4) the 515 farm housing units, mostly sold last year.

The article states that this operation of get-

ting the government out of the direct ownership and management of nearly a million homes "outstrips the record of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation, which in 1951 closed up shop after having put back into private hands the 800,000 homes it had taken in foreclosure during 1933 and the following three depression years."

Recent Zoning Law Decisions

A unanimous decision of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in March of this year, holding that the police power may be used to enforce architectural control on behalf of a community's aesthetic appearance, is considered by planning officials to be a landmark in zoning law. The case arose out of a provision of the zoning ordinance of Fox Point, Wisconsin, a village near Milwaukee zoned entirely for residential use, which regulates the exterior architectural appearance of new buildings. A circuit court had ruled that the ordinance constituted an improper use of the zoning power, traditionally confined to promoting public health, morals, and safety.

The Supreme Court, in overruling the decision of the lower court, noted that the general rule that the zoning power may not be exercised for purely aesthetic considerations has been undergoing a change, and cited the recent decision of the U.S. Supreme Court upholding the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945. In that decision, the nation's highest court said: "It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled."

The District of Columbia case reached the Supreme Court when a special three-judge federal court, while upholding the constitutionality of the D.C. law, expressed uncertainty as to whether property could be taken from one businessman and sold later to another. On this point the Supreme Court held that, always providing that the constitutional requirement for just compensation is met, it is for the legislature, not the judiciary, to decide whether a proper way to redevelop a blighted area is to resell it for private use.

In addition to supporting the Fox Point or-

dinance, this decision of the U.S. Supreme Court is regarded as adding great weight to the rulings previously handed down by the highest courts in twenty states holding that redevelopment agencies may use the power of eminent domain to acquire blighted areas for resale to private developers.

Transit Seminar

When a panel of experts faced more than twenty newsmen in a two and one-half day discussion of "The Nation's Urban Transit Crisis," three major, interrelated points emerged: (1) people will have to be convinced that the private car is not the most expeditious way to carry them to and from work, home, or leisure activities; (2) the only way that that conviction can be instilled is for urban transit to become a lot more speedy, comfortable, and accessible; and (3) the only way for cities to avoid strangulation in their own traffic congestion, and unlimited costs for parking and highway facilities which encourage private cars, is to make public transit economical and competitive by relieving transit riders of financial burdens not imposed on individual motorists.

Those points were made at a Public Administration Clearing House press seminar, held June 22-24, at 1313 East Sixtieth Street, Chicago. The seminar was the eighth held by PACH since 1943 with the intent of furnishing background information to newsmen who write on problems of public administration. Governing bodies of at least a dozen cities and a dozen states are now involved in studies of transit problems, and it was this situation that led PACH to choose urban transit as the subject of the 1955 seminar. Statistics and background material for the seminar were compiled by the American Transit Association.

During the seminar sessions, elaboration of the financial argument stressed that government subsidies to private cars and trucks make competition too stiff for urban transit systems which pay taxes and fixed charges. Expressways and parking lots were cited as examples of the government subsidy given to one person with a stake in transportation—the driver of a private car—and withheld from another—the public transit rider. A relief of transit costs could take various forms, such as relieving the tax burden

on transit operators, providing a right-of-way for buses along expressways, or underwriting the capital investment in a transit operation.

Panel members also spoke of the need for a balance in the use of private car and public transportation. Since World War II, the use of the private auto has increased enormously, and patronage of bus, streetcar, elevated, and subway has dropped down and down. All evidence is that people will keep on buying and using cars. If these cars can be used primarily as a kind of feeder to urban transit at one end of the line and kept for pleasure jaunts and running neighborhood errands, then a balance will have been partly reached. But transit will have to become attractive—fast, convenient, and smooth-riding—for people to choose it over a car at some point in their journey.

Some of the experts thought that the emphasis on expressways primarily for private cars and on off-street parking lots downtown may serve only to compound the trouble it seeks to cure. Such measures may merely attract more and more cars into downtown centers, causing more and more of a jam. At peak hours, even an expressway that has a reserved lane for buses is small help. For a bus gets bogged down in the early-morning or late-evening rush just as much as a car does. On the other hand, expressways that circle the central business district and keep cars from clogging the heart of a city are a help, as are off-street parking lots in outlying areas, close to transit stops so that drivers can park and take a bus downtown.

City planners on the panel emphasized this view of the transit crisis: it is one of the many crises arising from urbanization and should be viewed in its relationship to the whole urban scene. Suburbs and the central city both suffer when transit lines do not stretch out far enough to make the compact attractions of the downtown business district available to fringe residents. The residents are isolated; the downtown merchants lose business. This double disappointment is just one result of the general lack of over-all planning in metropolitan areas today, and the story is the same in regard to water supply, sewage disposal, garbage collection, street lighting, and police and fire needs. Urban transit is not the only aspect of big-city living that needs coordination of present services and planning for the most efficient use of

future facilities. The call for service makes itself heard regardless of historical political boundaries, and the response may also have to cross over the lines demarcating cities or counties or even states.

Consolidated Street-Use Ordinances

In order to reduce inconvenience and traffic congestion and provide better control of subsurface utility operations, many municipalities are consolidating their regulations concerning street openings into a single street-use ordinance which has general application. A review of recent developments in this area of municipal regulation is contained in a series of articles in the *Public Works Engineers' Newsletter*, monthly publication of the American Public Works Association.

The principal facilities that require the opening of city streets for installation or repair are lines for water, sewage, electric power, telephone, gas, and steam; mail tubes; and traffic signal cables.

According to the association, a comprehensive street-use ordinance should require the following safeguards: a city permit to open any street; assurance that the municipality will be protected from any personal or property damages that result from such work; posting of a bond to assure that the opening will be properly restored; provision for adequate barricades so that the work will inconvenience the general public as little as possible; and provision for fine or imprisonment for violations. A number of municipalities also grant officials authority to establish the details of the regulations which are necessary to enforce the ordinance fairly.

One measure that is being taken to lessen the need for street openings is to require the installation of some utilities in new subdivisions before they become a part of a city. Some regulations call for the installation of certain utility lines under sidewalks or in the rear of properties and thus avoid placing them under heavily traveled streets. Many municipalities also require utilities to install or extend all necessary understreet facilities within a limited period after they have been notified that a particular street is to be permanently improved. Several cities have adopted the practice of re-

quiring that a penalty charge be made when it is necessary to make an opening in a newly-paved street.

Audit Services to Governmental Agencies

A statement on *Competitive Bidding for Audit Services to Governmental Agencies* has been formulated and issued jointly by the American Institute of Accountants and the Municipal Finance Officers Association. The policy statement takes issue with the tendency of many city councils and other legislative bodies to require competitive bids when they are arranging for audits in government agencies responsible to them.

Noting that competitive bidding "has long been associated with efficient administration of governmental organizations" as the "best known guarantee of obtaining the highest quality of commodities at the lowest price possible," the joint statement points out that auditing is a professional service, not a commodity, and that it is not practical to apply to it the exact specifications and standards which can be effectively applied, for example, to automobile tires or construction materials. The same people who call for competitive bids on auditing jobs, according to the statement, "would never think of advertising for bids in order to hire appraisers in condemnation actions, or a special attorney to represent them in court, or an architect to draw plans and supervise construction of a building, or any type of special consultant other than an auditor."

The joint committee thinks that in most cases where public officials consider themselves bound by statute to call for competitive bids in the selection of an auditor, a legal opinion would show that the law does not apply to auditing because it is a professional service. If large governmental organizations are reluctant to take the responsibility for selecting one firm over another, it is suggested that they make a joint appointment of several firms, with each firm handling some particular phase of the audit. In any event, agencies are advised to arrive at a definite understanding with the auditor on the scope of the audit, what ground is to be covered, and approximately how long it will take if no unforeseen problems are encountered. Then the auditor is in a position, if

required, to state a ceiling above which his daily charges will not go.

Time Off for Safety, Courtesy

City employees of Hollywood, Florida, get an extra half day's vacation every six months if they have perfect safety records and no black marks for being discourteous in citizen contacts. The plan went into effect when a reduction in the work week from 44 to 40 hours made it necessary to change the amount of vacation time, which is figured on the basis of hours worked. Instead of shortening the regular vacation time by one day, officials decided to offer the bonus half-day vacation as an incentive to employees to take special care to avoid accidents and to keep them aware of their responsibility for good public relations.

Educational Leave for Puerto Rican Public Employees

The government of Puerto Rico offers its employees up to two years in educational leave and has an annual \$350,000 appropriation for employee scholarships, according to a recent report of the Civil Service Assembly. In the view of Puerto Rican officials, employees who benefit by more education will in most cases do their jobs better.

Educational leaves must be recommended by the department head and approved by the office of personnel. Employees who are selected get scholarships for as long as they need to complete training for a particular position. The sum covers tuition fees, traveling expenses, and a monthly allowance which varies from \$60 to \$350. Educational leaves with full salary are given to employees who undertake a two-year course which may include on-the-job training, such as in meat packing plants or merchandising firms. These persons must pay for their own tuition, books, travel, and other expenses.

In addition to scholarships, the office of personnel sometimes hires its own instructors to give on-the-job training for certain employees. One of these courses in supervisory training proved so successful that the University of Puerto Rico is considering adding the course to its public administration curriculum.

Training leaves for shorter periods are also granted, usually for six months, and are avail-

able for study or training in a foreign country. In these cases, the employee receives his full salary plus travel expenses and a per diem allowance.

Employees can also take an hour or two off from work to attend classes and charge the time to their annual leave. Tuition payments up to \$36 are made for employees enrolled in evening courses related to their work.

Political Activity of Civil Servants in Singapore

The government regulations regarding the participation of the Singapore civil service in political activities have been amended to permit certain categories of public service personnel to run for office in the community, to hold office in a political organization, and to engage actively in political campaigns in other ways.

For the purposes of this regulation, all personnel are divided into two classes—restricted and unrestricted. Persons in the restricted class are not allowed to engage in any political activity and are instructed to "maintain complete reserve in all political matters or matters of public controversy." Persons in the unrestricted class may (a) offer themselves as candidates for election to the Legislative Council, the city council, or other statutory body representative of the community or any section thereof; (b) hold office in any political organization, whether central or local; (c) speak on any public platform on any political matter; (d) write letters to the press, publish any printed matter, broadcast, or in any other way give public expression to views on any political matter; and (e) canvass for political purposes.

Although the amended regulations appear to allow a remarkable degree of latitude for civil service employees, the schedule of positions included in the unrestricted class indicates that the traditional neutrality of the public service is not likely to be seriously impaired by the change. All of the positions affected are in the lower grades of the service, including such interesting categories as "marine light keepers" and "taxidermist at the Raffles Museum and Library." Excepted from the unrestricted class, no matter what grade they hold, are all employees of the Singapore police force, prisons service, Judicial and De-

fense Departments, and all revenue officers, teachers,—and typists!

Orientation for University Contract Programs

The American Council on Education's Office on Institutional Projects Abroad reports that as of May 3, 1955, 43 United States colleges and universities were taking part in the Foreign Operations Administration-sponsored contract program in 31 countries through a total of 63 contracts. Under this program, designed to increase the amount of participation by private agencies in the technical cooperation program, U.S. institutions, sponsored and guided by the U.S. technical cooperation agency (formerly FOA; since July 1, 1955, the International Cooperation Administration), contract with sister institutions overseas to provide technical assistance in such fields as agriculture, education, engineering, public administration, public health, industrial research and development, and medicine.

The introduction into these programs of large numbers of people, many of them without previous overseas experience or without specific knowledge of the areas to which they are being assigned, has made it desirable to provide special orientation services, either through the Foreign Service Institute of the State Department in Washington or on home campuses. A third alternative is now available as the result of an arrangement made by the U.S. government with the Hoover Institute and Library of Stanford University to provide orientation services to institutional project staff members before they proceed to their overseas posts.

The orientation, lasting from two weeks to a month, will include intensive study of the history, culture, and current conditions in the host country and the problems of adaptation to a foreign culture. It will also attempt to clarify the objectives of the contract under which the project staff is to operate and the rationale and "ground rules" of U.S. technical cooperation activities. Under a separate contract, Stanford agrees to answer inquiries and make suggestions, free of charge, to contracting institutions regarding home campus orientation programs.

Americans Abroad Aid Study of Comparative Administration

Teachers and students in the field of comparative public administration are profiting from the activities of the greatly increased number of Americans going abroad on Fulbright grants or on special assignments for the United Nations and other technical assistance programs. During the 1954-55 academic year, there were at least 44 Americans teaching or conducting research in public administration overseas as contrasted with not more than a half-dozen such travelers three or four years ago. This figure does not include a probably larger number of Americans directly employed in overseas missions of the United States and the United Nations as public administration advisers and consultants to governments.

By supporting agency, 21 of the 44 were under programs of the Foreign Operations Administration (now the International Cooperation Administration); 14 held Fulbright grants; 8 were on UN-sponsored projects; and 1 held a foundation grant. They were distributed in 16 countries: 22 in the Middle East, 14 in Asia, 6 in Europe, and 2 in Latin America. The greatest concentration was in Iran and Turkey where large university projects are under way with support from FOA-ICA.

As these people return and report on their observations and studies of administrative behavior and problems in the countries where they have been working, the quality and the quantity of available literature in the field is being greatly improved. The increase in the number of persons with special knowledge of foreign administration is also stimulating greater interest in the teaching of comparative administration.

At the annual meeting of the American Society for Public Administration in New York last March, 21 people responded to an informal notice inviting them to get together to discuss progress and problems in comparative public administration teaching. Ferrel Heady, associate professor of political science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, who chaired this meeting, has available a limited number of copies of the minutes of the discussion for distribution on request.

As a follow-up to this meeting, the American Political Science Association is devoting a ses-

sion of its annual conference in September to this same subject. Mr. Heady will again serve as chairman, and Fred W. Riggs, of Public Administration Clearing House, will present a paper on which the discussion will be based.

Johns Hopkins International Studies Overseas

The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D. C., has opened an overseas branch in Bologna, Italy. The new Bologna Center will provide opportunity for qualifying American students to do graduate study or field research on France, Germany, Austria, or Italy in close association with other students from those countries. The student body, limited to fifty, will be divided equally among Americans and Europeans, and the teaching staff will include eminent scholars from the continent.

Another overseas center associated with the Advanced Studies School is the Rangoon-Hopkins Center for Southeast Asian Studies which was established at Rangoon, Burma, in June, 1954, with the support of the University of Rangoon. The program of this center is designed to foster an increasing cooperation among the universities of Southeast Asia in research efforts of mutual interest and to provide a base for a few of the school's best qualified students who are specializing in the area. As a part of the first year's program, a Burma Seminar Series has been organized which is open to faculty and qualified students. Lectures in the series deal with Burmese culture, geography, Buddhism, and political and economic history of the country. The University of Rangoon is furnishing office and living quarters for the American members of the center, and The Johns Hopkins University has provided a working library suited to the needs of the program.

Handbook on International Study

The Institute of International Education has published a 300-page reference work of comprehensive information on study opportunities in the United States of special interest to foreign students and on opportunities for study abroad available to American students.

This *Handbook on International Study* contains information about government regulations affecting exchange students; fellowships, scholarships, and other grants for international study; short-term summer projects for exchange students; and organizations serving foreign students and visitors in the United States and abroad. The *Handbook* also includes a historical survey of exchange programs between the United States and other countries; a review of current research in international education; a bibliography of reference material; and an appendix providing information on accredited U.S. educational institutions, foreign medical education, offices of foreign governments in the United States, and a resume of public laws affecting exchange. The *Handbook* may be purchased from the IIE, 1 East 67th Street, New York 21, N. Y. Price, \$3.00.

PA Training for Foreign Government Officials

Increasing numbers of officials of foreign governments are receiving public administration training in the United States under the bilateral technical cooperation program administered by the International Cooperation Administration of the Department of State (formerly the Foreign Operations Administration). S. McKee Rosen, chief of the Training Branch of ICA's Public Administration Division, recently reported that 385 such officials had participated in their program during fiscal year 1955 as compared with 250 in 1954 and a projected 475 in 1956. In a recent typical month the branch was working with 166 officials representing 17 subfields and specialties of administration.

Programs for these participants, most of them high-ranking staff and operating officials, are planned in relation to each individual's education and experience following an analysis of the problems to be faced in the post to which he will return. During his stay, which may be from one to twelve months, each official receives both general and specialized training. The principal methods used include personal conferences with a training adviser, seminars and workshops, and guided observations in federal, state, and local government agencies.

In this program, which began more than a decade ago as an activity of the Budget Bureau, emphasis recently has been placed on evaluation, follow-up, and experimentation with new training methods in an effort better to meet the needs of officials from overseas. One successful innovation was a six-week seminar on supply management for 26 officials representing 9 Latin American countries. The seminar, which was conducted principally in Spanish by a former technical assistance public administration adviser in Costa Rica, included lectures, group discussions, and demonstrations of supply systems and procedures in federal and other agencies.

The Public Administration Training Branch, in cooperation with the Department of Agriculture, is also planning a series of management conferences for selected officials of foreign agricultural agencies who have come to the United States for training in that field. It is hoped that this will prove a practical means of broadening the training of agricultural technicians, many of whom return to their home governments to posts in which they have both administrative and technical responsibilities.

Colombo Plan Scholarships

The Australian government has established a program under the Colombo Plan to provide correspondence scholarships for Asian students. Between 300 and 400 scholarships are available under this plan to students from India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, Indonesia, Malaya, Singapore, Brunei, Sarawak, and North Borneo for study in a wide range of technical and academic subjects. Instruction will be given through state technical colleges and the External Studies Department of the University

of Queensland. Lessons will be sent students by airmail. Students doing outstanding work in the first part of their course may become eligible for full-time Colombo Plan scholarships enabling them to complete their studies in Australia.

Central American Unity

Regardless of Central America's political problems, real progress is being made toward unity of the region in several functional areas. Meeting at San Salvador in May, the economic ministers of the five Central American republics agreed on two joint projects: (1) the establishment of a paper and cellulose industry, to be located in Honduras with sponsorship and control by the five nations; and (2) the establishment of a Central American center for technological research, to be located in Guatemala and financed by the five nations with assistance from the United Nations. The economic ministers also agreed to continue an existing program of standardization of customs procedures and nomenclature as a step toward an eventual customs union.

The education ministers of the region, meeting at Guatemala in June, established subcommittees to develop detailed plans for the mutual recognition of primary, secondary, and preuniversity credits and for the exchange of professors and students. The ministers voted to request UNESCO to assist in preparing these plans and to make a study of the problems of adolescents in the region.

Last year the Central American states, with United Nations assistance, established the Advanced School of Public Administration at San Jose, Costa Rica. The school offers training to students and officials of national, state, and municipal governments of the region.

Research Notes—Announcement

The Editorial Board is planning to include in *Public Administration Review*, on an experimental basis, three or four pages devoted to short accounts of public administration research work in progress in schools and bureaus of public administration, in federal, state, and local government agencies, and in other public and private institutions. A section entitled *Research Notes*, to be based on reports submitted to the *Review*, will appear as often as is indicated by the volume of reports received.

The purpose of *Research Notes* will be to provide a medium for the exchange of information among research workers in public administration as well as to offer all readers of the *Review* an overview of important research work currently under way.

While experience will undoubtedly furnish the best indications of the types of research that should be reported in the *Research Notes*, the following preliminary guides for reporting are suggested:

1. Research contributing directly or indirectly to the development of the understanding of public administration;
2. Research in the practice of public administration where the findings will be of general utility;
3. Interdisciplinary research dealing with the subject matter and methods of public administration and of other fields of knowledge and action;
4. Research in other disciplines where the findings are of significance to public administration;
5. Research of particular value in the teaching of public administration.

In order to keep the scope of the *Research Notes* within manageable proportions it is suggested that the following limitations be observed:

1. Reports should generally be restricted to research work that will be completed in

the following twelve months. (In selected cases, however, progress reports on longer-term projects may be of sufficient interest to be included.)

2. Studies for which publication arrangements have been completed and which will appear in the fairly immediate future should not be reported.

3. Research that has been reported in other publications that have a wide circulation among public administrators should not be reported.

4. Doctoral dissertations should not be reported unless faculty members believe them to be of unusual significance, since dissertations are ordinarily listed in *The American Political Science Review*.

It is suggested that in reporting a research project the following points be covered in an abstract of not over 300 words:

1. The title of the project and the name(s) of the principal investigator(s);
2. The name of the institution where the work is being done and/or of the sponsoring agency;
3. A statement of the problem, hypotheses (if any), method of study, and major findings;
4. The expected date of completion.

The success of *Research Notes* will depend primarily upon the cooperation of Society members and subscribers in providing information about significant research under way. All are urged to submit information about such projects. This department of the *Review* will be managed by John C. Honey, Director, Government Studies Program, National Science Foundation, Washington 25, D. C. and abstracts should be addressed to him. For inclusion in the Autumn issue of the *Review*, abstracts should be received by September 15, 1955. Closing dates for subsequent issues are: December 1, 1955; March 1 and June 1, 1956.

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
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